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A RETURN TO EYES ON THE PRIZE: 
LITIGATING UNDER THE RESTORED NEW 
YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Craig Gurian∗
“The Legislature, by enacting an amendment of a statute changing the 
language thereof, is deemed to have intended a material change in the 
law.” 
 
—New York Statutes, Construction of Amendments1
“The courts in construing a statute should consider the mischief sought to 
be remedied by the new legislation, and they should construe the act in 
question so as to suppress the evil and advance the remedy.” 
 
—New York Statutes, Construction of Amendments2
INTRODUCTION 
 
Fifteen years ago, in 1991, New York City enacted comprehensive 
reforms to its local Human Rights Law3 in order to fight a civil rights 
counter-revolution that was already restricting civil rights protections on 
the national level.4
 
∗ Executive Director of the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York; Scholar-in-
Residence, Fordham Law School’s Stein Center for Law and Ethics; and Adjunct Associate 
Professor of Law at Fordham Law School.  Professor Gurian was the principal drafter of the 
Local Civil Rights Restoration Act and built and led a coalition of more than forty civil 
rights and allied groups that worked for its passage.  This article is dedicated to Lori, Mollie, 
Alison, and Nico. 
  These reforms never achieved their potential, a failure 
 1. N.Y. STAT. LAW § 193(a) (McKinney 2005). 
 2. Id. § 95. 
 3. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8 (1991).  These amendments (“1991 Amendments”) are 
found in NEW YORK CITY LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 145–81 (1991). [hereinafter 1991 LEG. 
ANN.].  The 1991 Amendments resulted from passage of Local Law 39 of 1991, available at 
www.antibiaslaw.com/LL39.pdf.  Title 8 of the Administrative Code is popularly known as 
the “City Human Rights Law.”  Except where otherwise specified, references to Title 8 refer 
to the provisions of the City Human Rights Law as they existed once the 1991 Amendments 
had been enacted. 
 4. In 1991, the United States was in the third year of generally conservative judicial 
appointments by President George Herbert Walker Bush, an administration that followed 
directly eight years of highly conservative appointments by President Ronald Reagan.  The 
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due, in significant measure, to the unwillingness of judges to engage in an 
independent analysis of what interpretation of the City Human Rights Law 
would best effectuate the purposes of that law.5  This unwillingness has not 
been an isolated phenomenon.  On the contrary, virtually every judge who 
has presided over a City Human Rights Law matter has simply asserted that 
the City Human Rights Law was nothing more than a carbon copy of its 
federal and state counterparts. 6
The recent enactment of the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act 
(“Restoration Act”)
 
7 reflects the New York City Council’s concern that the 
City Human Rights Law “has been construed too narrowly.”8  The law 
explicitly rejects the “carbon copy” theory: “In particular, through passage 
of this local law, the Council seeks to underscore that the provisions of 
New York City’s Human Rights Law are to be construed independently 
from similar or identical provisions of New York state or federal statutes.”9
The Restoration Act proceeds along two basic tracks.  One track consists 
of a series of amendments to particular sections of the law.  These 
amendments are significant in and of themselves and in terms of 
understanding the direction in which the Council wishes to see the law 
proceed.  These amendments expand retaliation protection, raise the 
maximum civil penalties that may be awarded in proceedings brought 
 
 
concern from those who believed in vigorous civil rights enforcement was not limited to 
national developments: “Even on the state level,” then Mayor David N. Dinkins stated, 
“narrow interpretations of civil rights laws have retarded progress.”  Remarks by Mayor 
David N. Dinkins at Public Hearing on Local Laws 1 (June 18, 1991) [hereinafter Mayor 
David N. Dinkins, Remarks] (on file with the New York City Council’s Committee on 
General Welfare), available at www.antibiaslaw.com/MayorsRemarks061891.pdf. 
 5. In fairness, advocates for victims of discrimination must also take responsibility for 
the stunted state of City Human Rights Law.  On far too many occasions, courts have not 
been asked to engage in this independent analysis. 
 6. More often than not, the assertion is set out in a footnote.  When the assertion is in 
the body of a decision, the proposition is set out in brief, conclusory terms without any 
discussion.  E.g., Payne v. MTA New York City Transit Authority, 349 F. Supp. 2d 619, 
629 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Since claims brought under the State HRL and City HRL are 
analyzed under the same substantive standards as claims brought under Title VII, summary 
judgment is granted in favor of defendant with respect to [plaintiff’s] state and local law 
claims, as well.”). 
 7. N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW NO. 85 OF 2005 (Oct. 3, 2005) [hereinafter  Restoration Act].  
The Restoration Act is found in NEW YORK CITY, LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL (2005) 
(forthcoming).  The text of the Restoration Act is available at 
www.antibiaslaw.com/RestorationAct.pdf.  The Restoration Act was signed into law on 
October 3, 2005, to be effective immediately.  For an analysis of which provisions of the 
Restoration Act are to be given retroactive effect, see discussion infra notes 337–350 and 
accompanying text. 
 8. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 1. 
 9. Id. 
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administratively,10 protect domestic partners against all forms of 
discrimination proscribed by the law,11
That second track is designed to eliminate the mechanism by which 
judges have failed to give the local law the expansive interpretation that the 
Council has intended.  The Act states that provisions of state and federal 
civil rights statutes should be viewed “as a floor below which the City’s 
Human Rights law cannot fall, rather than a ceiling above which the local 
law cannot rise.”
 require administrative 
investigations to be thorough, and restore the availability of attorney’s fees 
in catalyst cases. I defer exploration of these amendments until Part II of 
this article only because it is the Restoration Act’s other track that is 
intended to be transformative. 
12  This ought not be a revolutionary proposition.  That 
idea, after all, has found explicit statutory expression for forty years.13  
Nevertheless, the reality is that there has been very little independent 
development of the local law, even in circumstances where the language of 
a specific City Human Rights Law provision varies from that of its federal 
or state counterpart.14
The Act also amends section 8-130, the construction provision of the 
City’s Human Rights Law, something the 1991 amendments had not done.  
In so doing, the Restoration Act takes direct aim at the premises and 
practices that have underlain interpretations of the statute.  The 
construction provision—which is an operative provision as much as any 
other section of the law—is revised as follows (additions italicized; 
deletions bracketed): 
 
The provisions of this [chapter] title shall be construed liberally for the 
accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof, 
regardless of whether federal or New York State civil and human rights 
laws, including those laws with provisions comparably-worded to 
provisions of this title, have been so construed.15
 
 10. Unlike Title VII, the City Human Rights Law permits an aggrieved party to seek 
administrative enforcement through the City’s Human Rights Commission or judicial 
enforcement through the bringing of a court action.  See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§  8-109, 8-
502(a).  Judicial actions may be brought directly; administrative filing is not a prerequisite. 
Id.  Rather than civil penalties, judicial actions provide for uncapped punitive damages. Id. 
 
 11. The City Human Rights Law’s proscriptions include those barring discrimination in 
employment, housing, and public accommodations. 
 12. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 1. 
 13. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2005); Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6(b) 
(2005) (proscriptions against discrimination in public accommodations); Fair Housing Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 3615 (2005); Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (2005). 
 14. See discussion infra notes 33–90 and accompanying text. 
 15. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 7. 
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Assertions that the purposes of the City Human Rights Law are no 
broader than those other civil rights laws are simply not tenable in the face 
of this amendment.  Likewise, the practice of robotically importing 
interpretations of federal and state civil rights statutes is inconsistent with 
the demand that liberal construction analysis must be performed without 
the result of that analysis being restricted or supplanted by the fact that 
federal and New York state civil rights laws have reached a result less 
friendly to victims of discrimination. 
There are three crucial consequences of the Restoration Act’s 
declaration of independence.  First, there will be no warrant to ratchet 
down the protections of the City Human Rights Law in the likely event that 
federal and state civil rights protections are constricted further.16
Second, areas of the law that have been treated as settled under City 
Human Rights Law, because they are settled for purposes of the 
counterpart statutes, will now be reopened for argument and analysis.  This 
result follows directly from the Restoration Act’s intention that decisions 
that have failed to construe City Human Rights Law provisions 
independently and robustly are not to be treated as controlling, and may 
only be afforded persuasive weight in limited circumstances.
  Indeed, 
the legislative history of the Restoration Act makes clear that the Council 
thought that federal and state civil rights laws had, by 1991, already been 
narrowed too far. 
17
Third—and this consequence is, unfortunately, of more moment than 
might at first be apparent—the Restoration Act’s removal of the crutch of 
assumed equivalence will persuade more judges to take a look at the actual 
language of specific provisions of the City’s Human Rights Law.  Doing so 
will cause them to see more differences with federal and state law—
including differences in the areas of individual liability, vicarious liability, 
punitive damages, availability of compensatory damages in mixed motive 
cases, the nature of burden shifting in disparate impact cases, the scope of 
  As such, 
advocates will be able to argue afresh (or for the first time) a wide range of 
issues under the City’s Human Rights Law, including the parameters of 
actionable sexual harassment, the vitality of protection against 
discrimination on the basis of marital status, the availability of a remedy for 
those persons with disabilities who need what the Second Circuit has 
characterized as “economic accommodations,” and the appropriate scope of 
damages. 
 
 16. This will mean, for example, that the broad standing that currently exists for fair 
housing organizations will not be able to be abridged.  See discussion infra notes 274–285 
and accompanying text. 
 17. See discussion infra notes 91-116 and accompanying text. 
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“public accommodations,” and the obligation of a housing provider to 
make and pay for reasonable modifications—than they have previously 
taken the time to recognize. 
It turns out—as the legislative history of the Restoration Act 
demonstrates—that the City Council had all three consequences 
unmistakably in view when passing the bill.18
Some things are clear, however.  Any judge who takes seriously the 
principle that a court must honor the will of the legislature now faces a new 
reality and an important challenge.  The need today for the development of 
the provisions of the City Human Rights Law by the process of judicial 
decision-making is not unlike the need for the development of the 
provisions of Title VII by the process of judicial decision-making which 
followed the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
  Will judges, consistent with 
the principles of statutory construction cited at the head of this article, be 
prepared to recognize that the City Council “intended a material change in 
the law,” even where the changes are more far-reaching than they 
themselves would have enacted?  Will they consider the “mischief to be 
remedied by the new legislation,” even if they personally believe that the 
remedy is actually the mischief?  Will they “construe the act in question so 
as to suppress the evil and advance the remedy,” even if their own views of 
what discrimination law should be are aptly summarized by the motto: 
“defendants are already too burdened”?  No legislation ever devised has 
provided a one hundred percent guarantee against judicial lawlessness, and 
so an article written in the immediate aftermath of the passage of the 
Restoration Act cannot set forth the answers to these questions with 
certainty. 
19
President Lincoln said—140 years ago—“let us strive on to finish the 
work we are in.”
  Any civil rights 
advocate who is dispirited with national developments can seek to take 
advantage of the opportunities for the expansion of civil rights protections 
offered by the Restoration Act: (1) directly in New York City, by 
embarking on litigation that has been effectively foreclosed elsewhere; or 
(2) in other states and municipalities where there is the political will to 
insist that anti-discrimination laws be interpreted robustly, by seeking to 
pass similar legislation to make real the protections of civil rights law. 
20
 
 18. See discussion infra notes 
  That task is still not completed; it is time that we got 
21–25 and accompanying text. 
 19. It is true that many aspects of federal anti-discrimination law that were entirely 
developed by judicial interpretation are handled by specific statutory provisions of the City 
Human Rights Law.  Even so, remarkably few provisions of City Human Rights Law have 
received thoughtful and independent analysis at any time. 
 20. President Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865). 
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back to work. 
PART I: BROAD, ROBUST, AND INDEPENDENT INTERPRETATION 
A. Sources for Construction 
To understand the intent and consequences of the Restoration Act, one 
begins, of course, with the text of the statute itself,21 but one must also 
consider the Act’s legislative history.  One key source was the report 
submitted to the full Council by the Committee on General Welfare, the 
committee from which the Restoration Act emerged.22
Another key source was statements made when the full Council 
considered and passed the bill at its meeting of September 15, 2005.  At 
that meeting, Council Member Annabel Palma, a member of the 
Committee on General Welfare, brought the attention of her colleagues to 
the intent and consequences of the legislation: 
 
Insisting that our local law be interpreted broadly and independently will 
safeguard New Yorkers at a time when federal and state civil rights 
protections are in jeopardy. 
There are many illustrations of cases, like Levin on marital status, 
Priore[,] McGrath and Forrest that have either failed to interpret the City 
Human Rights Law to fulfill its uniquely broad purposes, ignore the text 
of specific provisions of the law, or both. 
With Intro. 22, these cases and others like them, will no longer hinder the 
vindication of our civil rights. 
The work of the Anti-Discrimination Center was particularly important to 
the development and passage of this bill, and its testimony is an excellent 
guide to the intent and consequences of legislation we pass today. 
Statements from the Brennan Center and the Association of the Bar were 
also important to the Committee.  I have copies of all three and invite my 
colleagues to take a look at them and review them. 
And I would also like that a copy of each be placed in the record for 
 
 21. The Restoration Act was introduced as “Int. 22” (in the nomenclature of the City 
Council, a bill is referred to by its “Intro” number); the amended version that was passed by 
the Committee and then by the Council was referred to as “Int. 22-A.” 
 22. COMM. ON GEN. WELFARE, REPORT ON PROP. INT. NO. 22-A (Aug. 17, 2005) 
[hereinafter 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT], available at 
http://antibiaslaw.com/CommitteeReport081705.pdf.  The 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT is 
found in the 2005 New York City Legislative Annual.  NEW YORK CITY, LEGISLATIVE 
ANNUAL (2005) (forthcoming). 
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today’s Stated Meeting.23
In addition to the Center Testimony, Brennan Statement, and Bar Letter 
referred to in the referred to in Council Member Palma’s statement 
regarding the intent and consequences of the legislation—the items directly 
and explicitly brought to the full Council’s attention before the vote on the 
bill—additional testimony had been taken at General Welfare Committee 
hearings from a variety of civil rights and allied groups who supported the 
bill.
 
24
Finally, it is clear that the thrust of the 1991 amendments to the City’s 
Human Rights Law needs to be considered if one is to understand the 
Restoration Act: “Prop. Int. 22-A,” explains the 2005 Committee Report, 
aims to ensure construction of the City’s Human Rights Law in line with 
the purposes of the fundamental amendments to the law enacted in 1991.”
 
25
What is striking about each of these sources—the Restoration Act’s text, 
the 2005 Committee Report, Council Member statements, the testimony 
and statements cited to the full Council, additional hearing testimony, and 
the 1991 Amendments—is that they are all remarkably consistent.  In short, 
they convey, individually and in the aggregate, a vision that the City’s 
 
 
 23. Annabel Palma, Statement at the Meeting of the New York City Council 41–42 
(Sept. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with the office of the New York City Clerk). Council 
Member Bill deBlasio, the Chair of the Committee on General Welfare, emphasized that 
“localities have to stand up for their own visions” of “how we protect the rights of the 
individual,” regardless of federal and state restrictiveness.  Bill deBlasio, Statement at the 
Meeting of the New York City Council 47 (Sept. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with the New 
York City Clerk’s Office).  Council Member Gale Brewer, the chief sponsor of the 
Restoration Act, stated that she wanted to reiterate the comments of Council Members 
Palma and deBlasio, and that it was important to make sure that civil rights protections “are 
stronger here than [under] the State or federal law.”  Gale Brewer, Statement at the Meeting 
of the New York City Council 48–49 (Sept. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with the New York 
City Clerk’s Office). 
  Council Member Palma was referring to the testimony of the Anti-Discrimination 
Center, dated April 14, 2005 [hereinafter Center Testimony] (on file with the New York 
City Council’s Committee on General Welfare), available at 
www.antibiaslaw.com/CenterTestimony041405.pdf; the Statement of the Brennan Center 
for Justice, dated July 8, 2005 [hereinafter Brennan Center Statement] (on file with the New 
York City Council’s Committee on General Welfare), available at 
www.antibiaslaw.com/BrennanStatement070805.pdf; and a letter from the Association of 
the Bar, dated August 1, 2005 [hereinafter Bar Association Letter], (on file with the New 
York City Council’s Committee on General Welfare), available at 
www.antibiaslaw.com/BarAssociationLetter080105/pdf.  The cases she referred to are: 
Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2001); Priore v. N.Y. Yankees, 761 N.Y.S.2d 
608 (App. Div. 2003); McGrath v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 821 N.E.2d 519 (N.Y. 2004); and 
Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 819 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 2004). 
 24. Ironically, the only testimony against the bill at any of its hearings was that from 
representatives of the New York City Commission on Human Rights. 
 25. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 2. 
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Human Rights Law must meld the broadest vision of social justice with the 
strongest law enforcement deterrent, and that the judges interpreting the 
law take its protections to the furthest reaches of what is constitutionally 
permissible. 
B. The Mischief to be Remedied 
Federal and state courts routinely import federal or state standards when 
dealing with a city’s human rights law, a practice that has continued 
unabated over the years.26
The practice of automatic importation—or rote parallelism—undermines 
proper administration of the City Human Rights Law.  The practice was 
unwarranted for three principal reasons, which are discussed in turn below. 
 
1. Rote parallelism disregards the City’s intent                                            
in passing the 1991 Amendments 
The legislative history of the 1991 Amendments explicitly conveyed the 
local desire to have the City Human Rights Law construed robustly.  For 
example, then Mayor Dinkins stated that “it is the intention of the council 
that judges interpreting the City’s Human Rights Law are not to be bound 
by restrictive state and federal rulings and are to take seriously the 
requirement that this law be liberally and independently construed.”27
The Committee Report that accompanied the 1991 Amendments, noting 
that the legislation would “put the city’s law at the forefront of human 
rights laws,” went on to state that, “[f]aced with restrictive interpretations 
of human rights laws on the state and federal levels, it is especially 
significant that the city has seen fit to strengthen the local human rights law 
at this time.”
 
28  It also stated that “particular attention should be given” to 
the construction section of the law.29
 
 26. See e.g., Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 122 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Our 
consideration of claims brought under the state and city human rights law parallels the 
analysis used in Title VII claims.”) (quoting Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 565 
n.1 (2d. Cir. 2000)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1016 (2003); Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the 
Blind, 819 N.E.2d 998, 1007 n.3 (N.Y 2004) (internal citations omitted) (“The standards for 
recovery under the New York State Human Rights Law . . . are the same as the federal 
standards under [T]itle VII. . . . Further, the human rights provisions of the New York City 
Administrative Code mirror the provisions of the [State Human Rights Law] and should 
therefore be analyzed according to the same standards.”). 
 
 27. Mayor David N. Dinkins, Remarks, supra note 4, at 1. 
 28. COMM. ON GEN. WELFARE, REPORT ON PROP. INT. NO. 465-A AND PROP. INT. NO. 
536-A 12 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 COMMITTEE REPORT] (on file with Committee), available 
at www.antibiaslaw.com/LL39CommitteeReport.pdf. 
 29. Id. 
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Unfortunately, the Council made no changes to the text of the 
construction provision itself except to remove language dealing with the 
issue of election of remedies.30  This meant that there was no ready textual 
flag in the law to alert judges that a different regime was intended.  Worse, 
because there was no private right of action under the City Human Rights 
Law until the enactment of the 1991 Amendments, and because judicial 
actions were not permitted to be commenced until nine months thereafter,31
The lack of modifications to the text of the construction provision gave 
the State Court of Appeals a means by which to ignore the intention of the 
1991 Amendments: the court ultimately dismissed the language of the 
Committee Report cited above as statements which “merely reflect the 
broad policy behind the local law to discourage discrimination.”
 
the temptation was overwhelming to shy away from developing a new body 
of law, and instead to rely on what had been twenty eight years of 
development of federal employment discrimination law and twenty four 
years of development of federal housing discrimination law, not to mention 
an even longer period during which the provisions of the State Human 
Rights Law and the City Human Rights Law were, in fact, largely identical. 
32
2. Rote parallelism ignores the liberal construction                                     
that has long been required 
 
The “liberal construction” requirement was not a new invention of the 
1991 Amendments.  The requirement, as mentioned earlier, had already 
been a part of the City Human Rights Law.  An identically-worded 
requirement had long been incorporated into the State Human Rights 
Law.33  Indeed, in interpreting cases arising under the State Human Rights 
Law, the Court of Appeals used to recognize that: “Analysis starts by 
recognizing that the provisions of the Human Rights Law must be liberally 
construed to accomplish the purposes of the statute . . . .”34
The idea that federal civil rights laws provide a floor below which other 
laws cannot fall, not a ceiling above which they can rise, is not a new 
invention either.  Title VII, for example, provides that: 
 
 
 30. The provision, previously codified as section 8-112 of the New York City Human 
Rights Law, was redenominated section 8-130.  See 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 175. 
 31. 1991 Amendments, supra note 4, § 4(7); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 180. 
 32. McGrath v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 821 N.E.2d 519, 524–25 (N.Y. 2004) (citing Krohn 
v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 811 N.E.2d 8, 12 (N.Y. 2004)).  The City Council’s rejection of the 
premises of McGrath, and its rejection of McGrath’s mechanism for analyzing cases, is 
discussed at length.  See infra notes 91–120 and 154–165 and accompanying text. 
 33. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 300 (McKinney 2005). 
 34. Cahill v. Rosa, 674 N.E.2d 274, 276 (N.Y. 1996). 
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Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any 
person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any 
present or future law of any State or political subdivision of a state, other 
than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act 
which would be an unlawful employment practice under this 
subchapter.35
Sometimes, federal law has been used to provide useful guidance 
consistent with the liberal construction requirement.  In In re Aurecchione 
v. New York State Division of Human Rights, for example, the Court of 
Appeals examined the question of whether pre-determination interest was 
available under the State Human Rights Law, notwithstanding the fact that 
the law makes no explicit reference to pre-determination interest.
 
36  In the 
context of recognizing that “a liberal reading of the statute is mandated to 
effectuate the statute’s intent,”37 the Court of Appeals itself considered 
what result would best further the State Human Rights Law’s purpose of 
making a victim whole.  Reviewing a Supreme Court case that considered 
Title VII’s purpose in making a victim whole,38 the Court of Appeals noted 
that federal case law in this area “proves helpful to the resolution of this 
appeal,”39
The problem is that the seeking of guidance has morphed into rote 
parallelism, diverting judges from the task of determining what 
interpretation of the statute best achieves its purposes.  Whereas 
Aurrecchione drew on a federal case because that federal case persuasively 
addressed the “make whole” relief about which the Court of Appeals was 
concerned,
 and ruled that the award of pre-judgment interest was 
appropriate in the case. 
40
 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2005); see also §§ 2000a-6(b) (public accommodations 
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 3615 (Fair Housing Act); 12201(b) (Americans 
with Disabilities Act).   
 the Court of Appeals ignored the statutory obligation of 
liberal construction altogether in the case of McGrath v. Toys “R” Us, 
 36. In re Aurecchione v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 771 N.E.2d 231, 233 (N.Y. 
2002). 
 37. Id. at 233. 
 38. Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 558 (1988). 
 39. Aurecchione, 771 N.E.2d at 233.  The Court of Appeals in Aurecchione (albeit in the 
context of comparing federal law with State not City Human Rights Law) was already 
relying on a consistent interpretation of state and federal civil rights laws in view of broad 
areas of similarity between them.  In Aurecchione, though, the Court was still looking at the 
purposes of the State Human Rights Law. Id. (“Clearly, a central concern of the Human 
Rights Law is to make . . . victims ‘whole’.”). 
 40. Aurecchione did foreshadow later problems with its uncritical references to federal 
and state law being “textually similar and ultimately employ[ing] the same standards of 
recovery.”  Id. 
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Inc.41
McGrath was a case which posed the question of what standard to apply 
regarding the award of attorney’s fees where a plaintiff who had proved 
discrimination to the satisfaction of a jury was only awarded nominal 
damages.  When the City Council passed the 1991 Amendments by which a 
private right of action was created, and simultaneously enacted an 
attorney’s fee provision in connection with that private right of action,
  The court simply assumed that the purposes of federal civil rights 
law were the same as those of the City Human Rights Law, ignored the fact 
that the United States Supreme Court case being imported had not 
examined or purported to examine what result would best fulfill the 
purposes of federal civil rights law, and did not itself engage in examining 
the consequences of its ruling on the rights of people who could prove they 
had been subject to discrimination.  
42 it 
was acting in the shadow of the Second Circuit’s then longstanding view 
that attorney’s fees were available in nominal damages cases.43
A year after the City Council had acted, the Supreme Court, in its 5-4 
Farrar decision, sharply cut back on the availability of attorney’s fees in 
cases which result in nominal damages only.
 
44  While the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the plaintiff who had won a liability verdict was a 
“prevailing party,” the majority concluded that where the prevailing party 
only is awarded nominal damages, “the only reasonable fee is usually no 
fee at all.”45
Despite the fact that the City Council could not have had the Supreme 
Court’s not-yet-developed Farrar rule in mind,
 
46
 
 41. 821 N.E.2d 519 (N.Y. 2004). 
 the Court of Appeals in 
 42. Previously, aggrieved parties could only proceed administratively, through the New 
York City Commission on Human Rights. 
 43. E.g., Ruggiero v. Krzeminski, 928 F.2d 558, 564 (2d Cir. 1991) (decided March 18, 
1991, just three months before the City Council amended the New York City Human Rights 
Law) (“The jury’s determination that appellants’ fourth and fourteenth amendment rights 
were violated by the search conducted by the Officers assuredly is significant. . . .  Although 
no compensatory damages were awarded, the jury’s determination ‘changes the legal 
relationship’ between the Ruggieros and the Officers in that a violation of rights had been 
found.”); McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 128 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Our decisions indicate 
that an award is not barred merely because the action was settled or the plaintiff was 
awarded only nominal damages.”); Milwe v. Cavuoto, 653 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(reversing district court denial of attorney’s fees award where plaintiff only won one dollar 
in nominal damages on a § 1983 claim). 
 44. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992). 
 45. Id. 
 46. The Court of Appeals reluctantly acknowledged this: “Granted, it is not surprising 
that the legislative history [of the 1991 Amendments] does not address the Farrar rule since 
the amendments predated Farrar by one year.”  McGrath, 3 N.Y.3d at 433. 
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McGrath proceeded to import the Farrar standard.47  The court’s principle 
justification for doing so was based on its “general practice of interpreting 
comparable civil rights statutes consistently, particularly since these broad 
[state and city] policies are identical to those underlying the federal 
statutes.”48 The court also stated that, if the City Council had disagreed 
with Farrar, it could have amended the City Human Rights Law to say 
so.49
The premises underlying the McGrath decision were faulty and 
misguided, especially in an era of continuing cutbacks in the reach of 
federal civil rights protections.  As the Brennan Center pointed out to the 
Council in urging support for the Restoration Act, “the court was wrong to 
assume that the federal decision relied on had considered whether the 
restrictive rule furthered the purposes of federal civil rights law.”
 
50  In fact, 
the Supreme Court in Farrar did not ever address or purport to address the 
question of whether its rule would help or hinder the enforcement of civil 
rights protections.51
Had any analysis been done of the role of attorney’s fees in civil rights 
litigation, that analysis would have strongly suggested that the Farrar rule 
did not accord with the purposes of federal civil rights law, let alone the 
purposes of City Human Rights Law.  The Senate Report on the Civil 
Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act of 1976, for example, pointed out that a 
variety of civil rights laws—including the public accommodations 
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (provisions which do not 
provide for damages)—”depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee 
awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a 
meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies 
which these laws contain.”
 
52  That report made plain how judges were to 
proceed: “In the civil rights area, Congress has instructed the courts to use 
the broadest and most effective remedies available to achieve the goals of 
our civil rights laws.”53
It is difficult to understand how Farrar could accord with the intention 
 
 
 47. Id. at 434. 
 48. Id. at 433. 
 49. Id. at 433-34. 
 50. Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 4. 
 51. If the Supreme Court had evaluated that issue, the Court of Appeals would still have 
had the question of whether the Supreme Court’s evaluation was persuasive in determining 
what rule met the purposes of the City Human Rights Law, but, in Farrar, there was not a 
question of agreeing or disagreeing with the Supreme Court’s liberal construction 
analysis—there simply, literally, was no liberal construction analysis. 
 52. S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 5910 (1976). 
 53. Id. at 5910-11 (emphasis added). 
GURIAN_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:12 PM 
2006] EYES ON THE PRIZE 113 
of Congress to use “the broadest and most effective remedies available.”  
Nevertheless, because of the “general practice” of the Court of Appeals to 
assume that there is federal and local equivalence, the court was blinded to 
its obligation to scrutinize Farrar to see whether in fact the reasoning of 
that decision was actually helpful in deciding the City Human Rights Law 
case the Court of Appeals had before it.54
So much was the Court of Appeals under the spell of rote parallelism, it 
failed to conduct its own analysis of whether adopting the Farrar rule for 
City Human Rights Law actions would further the purposes of the 
counterpart guarantees contained in City law.  Such an analysis would have 
had to come to grips with the fact that the Council had in 1991 done the 
exact opposite of narrowing the cases where fees would be available.  It 
created the private right of action (and accompanying attorney’s fee 
provision), identified the goal of the City Human Rights Law as preventing 
discrimination from playing “any role” in actions related to the various 
activities covered by the law, identified individual prosecution as part of 
the City’s overall effort to fight discrimination, referred to the availability 
of fees without indicating that any subcategory of those who had proved 
discrimination would be denied fees, and did all of these things in the 
context of comprehensive reforms, all of which significantly expanded the 
reach of the law.
 
55
Liberal construction analysis would have had to come to grips with the 
difficulties the Farrar rule imposes on persons seeking counsel to vindicate 
their rights.  Describing a case as a “nominal damages case” is an after-the-
fact construct.  Attorneys, by contrast, need to make decisions about case 
selection in real time, long before they know whether they will be able to 
get a jury to award monetary damages.  If proving liability is not sufficient 
to warrant a fee award, they will be discouraged not only from taking on 
cases where they “know” damages will not be awarded, but from taking on 
any cases where, though they have no doubt about proving that a defendant 
discriminated, they may have questions as to whether a plaintiff’s actual 
 
 
 54. The Court—and other automatic importers—has lost sight of the admonition made 
almost thirty years ago by the late Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.  Justice 
Brennan, writing in the context of state constitutional provisions, cautioned that state court 
judges “do well to scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal courts, for only if they are 
found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the 
policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive 
weight as guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guarantees.”  William J. Brennan, 
Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 
(1977) [hereinafter Brennan, Protecting Individual Rights]; see Brennan Center Statement, 
supra note 23, at 8. 
    55.  See 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 4. 
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damages will be recognized by a jury.56
None of the foregoing was considered, and, as such, a rule was imported 
without any court having ever engaged in the liberal construction analysis 
that had been required by section 8-130 of the local Human Rights Law. 
 
 The Court of Appeals’ alternative suggestion that the City Council 
could have changed the attorney’s fees provision—and, therefore, its 
conclusion that the Council’s failure to do so represents an implicit 
adoption of the ratcheted down federal standard—is both disingenuous and 
detrimental to the efficient and effective operation of the City Human 
Rights Law.  The City Council had an explicit provision of law in place—
the construction requirement of section 8-130—that it was entitled to have 
enforced.  Both the Council and the Mayor had expressly noted the 
importance of having that provision enforced. Each had said that federal 
and state law were already too narrow as of 1991.  Just because courts have 
subsequently failed to meet their obligations to engage in liberal 
construction analysis is no reason to suppose that the Council affirmatively 
believed at any time that Farrar was the one area of federal law where the 
City should go along with the federal civil rights rollback. 
What the Court of Appeals was really doing in McGrath was providing a 
formal announcement that the scope and content of the New York City 
Human Rights Law would always be at the mercy of the latest federal or 
state retrenchment.  Perhaps the Supreme Court will come to embrace the 
thrust of the 2004 Seventh Circuit decision written by Judge Richard 
Posner wherein he suggested that the Fair Housing Act is not intended to 
prohibit post-acquisition harassment in the fair housing context.57
 
 56. Cf. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).  In that case, 
which limited the circumstances under which a losing plaintiff would be vulnerable to 
paying attorney’s fee to a defendant, the Supreme Court cautioned district courts “to resist 
the understandable temptation to engage in post
  Presto—
the City Human Rights Law would, on a McGrath analysis, no longer 
 hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a 
plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without 
foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for 
seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success.”  Id. at 421-22.  In other 
words, if plaintiffs who had a good faith belief that their rights had been violated faced the 
risk that not prevailing would expose them to paying the defendant’s attorney’s fees, the 
resulting chilling effect “would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous 
enforcement of the provisions of Title VII.”  Id. 
 57. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The 
Fair Housing Act contains no hint either in its language or its legislative history of a concern 
with anything but access to housing.”).  Halprin is not alone.  See, e.g., Cox v. City of 
Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing the quoted Halprin language with 
approval, and rejecting a claim based on impaired “habitability,” but not ruling out claims of 
constructive eviction); see also discussion infra notes 268–273 and accompanying text. 
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proscribe such conduct either.58  The City Council should not be forced to 
leap into action to protect the City’s law every time some other law is cut 
back.59
3. Rote parallelism blinded judges to those areas                                  
where the City law is textually distinct 
 
The easy habit of “dropping the footnote” has led judges to misconstrue 
provisions of the City Human Rights Law on a regular basis, committing 
either the sin of failing to bother to read the statute, or the sin of failing to 
believe what they have read. 
In Forrest, for example, the Court of Appeals, asserting that the 
provisions of the City Human Rights Law “mirrored” those of the State 
Human Rights Law,60 stated in dicta that, even if the quantum of 
harassment had been sufficient to be actionable, the defendant would not be 
liable for its supervisor’s harassment under the State Human Rights Law 
because an “employer cannot be held liable [under state law] for an 
employee’s discriminatory act unless the employer became a party to it by 
encouraging, condoning, or approving it.”61 The court was apparently 
contemplating the City Human Rights Law as well, because the footnote to 
its vicarious liability discussion referenced the availability of the federal 
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense under both City and State Human 
Rights Law in “hostile work environment” cases.62
The court correctly set forth the law insofar as it referred to the State 
Human Rights Law.
 
63
 
 58. The protection provided by the Restoration Act against this particular result is 
discussed infra at notes 
  It ignored, however, the explicit statutory text of 
268–273 and accompanying text. 
 59. The existing practice of rote parallelism has also meant that other doctrines clearly 
inconsistent with a liberal construction requirement have become known as “well 
established” despite the absence of liberal construction analysis, and have thus been 
effectively shielded from challenge on a local level.  For example, very real victims of very 
real harassment are regularly deprived of the opportunity to have their cases go to a jury 
because of the requirement—imposed as a matter of federal caselaw—that the victim 
demonstrate that the harassment is “severe or pervasive.” Less burdensome requirements, 
more consistent with the City Human Rights Law’s twin focus on victim’s rights and 
maximum deterrence, could easily be developed—see infra notes 190–213 and 
accompanying text—but my research has found no case where a federal or state judge has 
thus far treated the question of the appropriate standard under City law as anything other 
than a closed question, already determined by the contours of federal law. 
 60. Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 819 N.E.2d 998, 1007 n.3 (N.Y. 2004). 
 61. Id. at 311. 
 62. Id. at 312 n.10. The federal affirmative defense was established in Faragher v. City 
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 
(1998). 
 63. The Court did not deal explicitly with two circumstances where the employer would 
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section 8-107(13)(b) of the City Human Rights Law, which provides for 
three separate and independent circumstances under which an employer 
shall be liable for the conduct of “an employee or agent” that is in violation 
of the relevant employment discrimination provision of the statute.64  One 
of these is where “the employee or agent exercised managerial or 
supervisory responsibility.”65  Section 8-107(13)(b)(1) imposes no 
requirement that the employer encourage, condone, or acquiesce in the 
conduct.66  In fact, Totem Taxi, one of the cases cited by Forrest for the 
contrary proposition,67 was a motivating factor for creating a distinct 
vicarious liability regime as part of the 1991 Amendments.68
It is true that there is a provision of the employer liability section that 
sets forth an affirmative defense which involves pleading and proving the 
establishment of, and compliance with, “policies, programs and procedures 
for the prevention and detection of unlawful discriminatory practices.”
 
69 
This affirmative defense, however, does not apply to the question of 
liability for the conduct of employees and agents who exercise managerial 
or supervisory responsibility.  It is only relevant to a liability determination 
in the context of co-employee harassment where the question is whether the 
employer should have known of the discriminatory conduct and failed to 
exercise reasonable diligence to prevent such conduct.70
 
be automatically liable: (1) where the employee is a proxy of the employer; or (2) where the 
acts involved are “quintessentially” those of an employer.  See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 
789-90 (person sufficiently high in managerial hierarchy may have his acts imputed to 
employer; a discriminatory discharge or failure to promote is the act of the employer). 
Neither of these circumstances was present in Forrest, so the Court of Appeals had no 
reason to address them. 
  In other words, 
 64. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(13)(b).  The relevant substantive provision is section 
8-107(1)(a).  Note that employers in the housing, public accommodations, and retaliation 
contexts are strictly liable for the conduct of their employees and agents in all 
circumstances.  Id. § 8-107(13)(a). 
 65. Id. § 8-107(13)(b)(1). 
 66. A memorandum summarizing major provisions of the 1991 Amendments stated that, 
in respect to: “[l]iability of employers for acts of employees and agents,” the 1991 
Amendments provide for “[s]trict liability in housing and public accommodations” and 
provide for “[s]trict liability in employment context for acts of managers and supervisors.”  
1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 187.  The Council designed the vicarious liability section 
to, inter alia, “hold employers to a high level of liability for employment discrimination.”  
1991 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6. 
 67. Forrest, 3 N.Y.3d at 311 (citing In re Totem Taxi, Inc. v. N.Y. State Human Rights 
Appeal Bd., 480 N.E.2d 1075 (N.Y. 1985)). 
 68. “Even on the state level, narrow interpretations of civil rights laws have retarded 
progress.  For example, the State Court of Appeals has made it virtually impossible to hold 
taxi companies responsible for the discriminatory acts committed by their drivers.”  Mayor 
David N. Dinkins, Remarks, supra note 4, at 1. 
 69. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(13)(d). 
 70. Section 8-107(13)(e) specifies that section 8-107(13)(b)(3)—the “should have 
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the City Council made a different choice in 1991 about liability of 
supervisors and managers than did the Supreme Court in 1998,71
Another egregious example of the “failure to read” problem is a state 
case posing the question of whether “Work Experience Program” 
participants were protected against sexual harassment.
 but the 
blinders of rote parallelism prevented the Forrest court from seeing this. 
72  The judge, 
believing that participants could not be classified as employees, and 
asserting that the State and City Human Rights Laws “are limited in 
applicability to the employment relationship,” dismissed the complaint.73  
In fact, even if the Work Experience Program participants were not 
employees, they may well have been covered under the “provider of public 
accommodations” section and the “training program” sections of the law.74
Priore v. New York Yankees
 
75 presented a twist on the problem 
illustrated by the foregoing cases.  In Priore, the First Department may 
have read the statute, but apparently did not want to believe what it said.  
Before the 1991 Amendments, individuals were liable for their own 
discriminatory acts in the housing and public accommodations contexts, 
but were not generally liable in the employment context.76
 
known” about co-employee harassment section—is the only liability determination able to 
be affected by the establishment of the affirmative defense.  It then goes on to provide that 
the establishment of the affirmative defense shall be considered as a factor in mitigating the 
amount of punitive damages or civil penalties to be imposed. 
  The 1991 
 71. This was the year that Faragher and Ellerth were decided.  By making the 
affirmative defense only go to mitigation, not elimination, of punitives, it also made a 
different decision from what the Supreme Court made in Kolstad v. American Dental 
Association, 527 U.S. 526 (1999).  See infra notes 292–302 and accompanying text. 
 72. McGhee v. City of New York, No. 113614/01, 2002 WL 1969260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2002). 
 73. Id. at *3.  Cf. United States v. City of N.Y., 359 F.3d 83, 91-97 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(holding that New York City work experience program participants are employees within 
the meaning of Title VII). 
 74. See  N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-102(9), 8-107(2)(c), 8-107(4). 
 75. Priore v. N.Y. Yankees, 761 N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 2003).  
 76. Compare the pre-1991 Amendments versions of sections 8-107(5)(a) and 8-107(2) 
of the New York City Human Rights Law (proscribing conduct by persons in the housing 
and public accommodations realms, respectively) with the pre-1991 Amendments version of 
section 8-107(1)(a) (only proscribing conduct by “employers” in the workplace realm).  The 
term “persons,” pre-1991 Amendments, had been defined pursuant to section 8-102(1) to 
include “individuals” (the 1991 Amendments, inter alia, replaced “individuals” with 
“natural persons”).  The provisions cited are contained in 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 
155-56, 153-54, and 152 respectively.  The impact of the change is evidenced by the 
outcome of In the Matter of the Complaints of Abdalkwy v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & 
Ives, Nos. EM00106-4/19/88, EM00104-4/19/88, EM00105-4/19/88, 1991 WL 1288827, 
*18 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., June 28, 1991) (decision and order). In this employment case, 
which arose prior to the 1991 Amendments, the individual discriminator was found not 
liable because he had neither a financial interest in the employer entity nor the power to do 
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Amendments took each of the various employment discrimination 
provisions, all of which had proscribed workplace conduct by “employers,” 
and expanded each of those provisions to proscribe workplace conduct by 
the entity “or an employee or agent thereof.”77  This was one change that 
several decisions on both the state and federal level did not seem to have 
trouble appreciating.78  Notwithstanding this, the Priore court held that 
“There is no indication in the local ordinance, explicit or implicit, that it 
was intended to afford a separate right of action against any and all fellow 
employees based on their independent and unsanctioned contribution to a 
hostile environment.”79
The Priore court chose not to pay heed to the relevant portion of then-
Mayor Dinkins’ statement in signing the 1991 Amendments: 
 
I myself was surprised to learn that under current local law, an employee 
who has been the victim of sexual or racial harassment at the hands of a 
co-worker can sue her employer but cannot sue the co-worker himself.  
Without the possibility of legal action, co-worker harassment has 
continued to poison many of our workplaces.  The new law takes the 
fundamental step of making all people legally responsible for their own 
discriminatory conduct.80
The Priore court compounded its error by failing to consider the 
Committee Report accompanying the 1991 Amendments.  The report had 
stated that the pre-Amendments employment discrimination provisions of 
City law were “silent as to the individual liability of their employees and 
agents for such practices,”
 
81
 
more than carry out decisions made by others.  The Administrative Law Judge in her 
February 25, 1991 Recommended Decision and Order had noted that “[o]nly amendment of 
the Code by legislation can remedy this problem.” Id. at 25 n.4. 
 but the 1991 Amendments, “would make 
 77. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d), (2), (3). 
 78. See, e.g., Murphy v. ERA United Realty, 674 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (App. Div. 1998) 
(Section 8-107(1)(a) of the New York City Human Rights Law “expressly provides that it is 
unlawful for ‘an employer or an employee or agent thereof’ to engage in discriminatory 
employment practices.  Accordingly, the plaintiff has a cause of action under this provision 
against the employer as well as her coemployees.”); Lee v. Overseas Shipholding Group, 
No. 00 CIV. 9682(DLC), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15355, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2002) 
(individual liability under City law “regardless of ownership or decision-making power”); 
Kojak v. Jenkins, No. 98 Civ. 4412(RPP), 1999 WL 244098, at *7 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 
1999) (employment discrimination sections of City law “clearly provide for individual, 
personal liability”); Harrison v. Indosuez, 6 F. Supp. 2d 224, 233-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“As 
the [City law] specifically allows for employee liability, there is no question that the law is 
applicable against [the defendant] in his individual capacity.”); Alvarez v. J.C. Penney Co., 
No. 96 Cv. 5165, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21695, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1997) (“the plain 
language of the Code provides for liability against individual employees”). 
 79. Priore, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 614. 
 80. Mayor David N. Dinkins, Remarks, supra note 4, at 3-4 (emphasis added). 
 81. COMM. ON GEN. WELFARE, REPORT ON PROP. INT. NO. 465-A AND PROP. INT. NO. 
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explicit such individual liability.”82
How, then, did the court in Priore try to justify its conclusion that there 
was no individual liability?  The court literally had to invent a legislative 
history.  It asserted that, when the City extended liability to “an employer 
or an employee or agent thereof,” it did so merely “in substitution for the 
State statute’s ‘employer or licensing agency’.”
 
83  In fact, however, section 
8-107(1)(a) of the City Human Rights Law did not deal with licensing 
agencies before the 1991 Amendments, and it did not deal with licensing 
agencies after the 1991 Amendments.84  There had been a separate 
provision of the City Human Rights Law that had dealt both with age 
discrimination by employers and with licensing agencies.85  The 
proscription against age discrimination by employers was moved into 
section 8-107(1)(a); the proscription against age discrimination by licensing 
agencies was moved into an entirely different section, to join other 
proscriptions on certain conduct by licensing agencies.86  Accordingly, the 
revision to section 8-107(1)(a) did not represent a substitution of language 
from the State Human Rights Law, it represented an addition of language 
not found in the State Human Rights Law.87
To go along with its tale of how the language of the law changed, the 
Priore court provided a theory of Council intent.  It speculated that the 
Council had only wanted to permit individual liability where the individual 
had been acting with or on behalf of the employer in some agency or 
 
 
536-A: SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS 9–10 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 COMMITTEE REPORT 
ANALYSIS] (on file with Committee of General Welfare), available at 
www.antibiaslaw.com/LL39CommitteeReport.pdf. 
 82. Id.; see also 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 187 (documenting contemporaneous 
memoranda summarizing the impact of the impact of the 1991 Amendments).  The law went 
from having a standard under which an employee was only liable where he or she “had the 
power to do more than carry out decisions made by others” to a regime where “employees 
and agents are responsible for their own discriminatory acts.”  Id. 
 83. Priore, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 614. 
 84. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(1)(a) (examining both the pre-1991 Amendments 
version and the version in place after the 1991 Amendments).  1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 
3, at 154. 
 85. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(3-a) (in effect prior to the 1991 Amendments, but 
deleted by those amendments); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 155. 
 86. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(1)(a), 8-107(9); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 
156, 160. 
 87. In other words, a proscription on conduct by “employers and employees and agents 
thereof” was, not surprisingly, intended to have broader effect than a proscription on 
conduct by “employers” alone.  Further proof of the baselessness of the Court’s 
interpretation is found in the fact that the phrase “or employees or agents thereof” was 
added to each and all of the operative employment discrimination proscriptions, N.Y.C. 
ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(1) AND (2), even one where the phrase modified only the term “labor 
organization.”  Id. § 8-107(1)(c); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 152. 
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supervisory capacity.88  The problem is, if that were the Council’s purpose, 
it need not have acted at all: section 8-107(6) of the City Human Rights 
Law already was broader, providing that it “shall be an unlawful 
discriminatory act for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the 
doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter, or to attempt to do 
so.”89
The Priore court was surely aware of the basic rule of statutory 
construction that, “in the interpretation of a statute, the court must assume 
that the Legislature did not deliberately place in the statute a phrase 
intended to serve no purpose, but must read each word and give to it a 
distinct and consistent meaning. . . “
 
90
C. The Rejection of the Rote Parallelism Model:                         
Different Premises; Different Procedure 
  Unfortunately, this knowledge was 
overborne by the court’s belief that the Council should not have wanted to 
do what it had done.  The only “substitution” involved in the case was the 
court’s insertion of itself as a replacement for the legislative branch of local 
government. 
The Restoration Act renders the rote parallelism model obsolete, and 
deprives cases decided via that model (and without consideration of liberal 
construction principles) of any precedential value. 
The Restoration Act requires that provisions of the City’s Human Rights 
Law hereafter be construed liberally to accomplish the “uniquely broad and 
remedial” purposes of the local law, “regardless of whether federal or New 
York State civil and human rights laws, including those laws with 
provisions comparably-worded to provisions of this title, have been so 
construed.”91  There is much packed into these new phrases; the revised 
construction section comprises the single most important sentence of the 
Restoration Act.92
 
 88. Priore, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 614. 
 
 89. See 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 160. 
 90. N.Y. STAT. LAW § 98 (McKinney 2005). 
 91. Restoration Act, supra note 7, at 13, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-130. 
 92. One seemingly minor change—from requiring liberal construction of the “chapter” 
containing  the substantive provisions of the City’s Human Rights Law to requiring liberal 
construction of the entire City Human Rights Law “title”—was necessitated by the 
argument actually advanced by the City Law Department in another Court of Appeals case 
that liberal construction did not apply at all because the case had been commenced in court 
pursuant to Chapter 5 of the City Human Rights Law, and that Chapter did not itself have a 
liberal construction provision. See Defendant’s Brief at 2004 WL 1091832, *25-26, Krohn v. 
N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 811 N.E.2d 8 (N.Y. 2004) (No. 03508) (“. . . section 8-130 limits 
application of the ‘liberal construction’ provision to chapter one of the [New York City 
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A fundamental premise of McGrath—and of the entire rote parallelism 
school—was that the purposes of the City Human Rights Law are 
“identical” to those of its state and federal counterparts.93  That premise is 
unequivocally rejected: post-Restoration Act local law now provides that 
its purposes are “uniquely broad and remedial.”  This alone makes the 
application of rote parallelism logically indefensible, and it requires judges 
to recognize two things.  First, since the local law’s purposes are even more 
broad and remedial than those of state and federal civil rights laws, 
interpretations of those other laws naturally constitute a floor of rights 
below which interpretations of City Human Rights Law should not fall.94  
Second, a judge must search out what the broader and more remedial 
purposes of the City Human Rights Law actually are in order for that judge 
to assess what potential interpretation of a particular provision would serve 
the law’s overall purposes best.95
The fundamental procedure of McGrath—and of the entire rote 
parallelism school—was, by definition, to import interpretations of federal 
or state civil rights laws automatically.  That procedure is unequivocally 
condemned: the process of liberal construction to accomplish the uniquely 
broad and remedial purposes of the local law must be allowed to proceed 
“regardless of whether federal or New York State civil and human rights 
laws . . . have been so construed.”
 
96  The demand for broad and 
independent construction came, inter alia, from the Center’s testimony,97 
from the Brennan Center Statement,98 and from the Bar Association 
Letter,99
 
Human Rights Law], entitled ‘Commission on Human Rights.’ Nothing in the New York 
City Human Rights Law instructs courts to apply a rule of liberal construction to section 8-
502(a), the provision creating a private right of action for ‘damages, including punitive 
damages,’ which appears in chapter five.”). 
 and is reflected, inter alia, in Council Member Palma’s 
 93. McGrath v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 821 N.E.2d 519, 525 (N.Y. 2004). 
 94. See, e.g., 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5 (“provisions of the human 
rights law may not be construed less liberally than interpretations of comparably worded 
federal and state laws”). 
 95. See discussion infra notes 121–165 and accompanying text regarding how to do so. 
 96. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 7 amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-130. 
 97. “In the end, regardless of federal interpretations, the primary task of a judge hearing 
a City Human Rights Law claim is to find the interpretation for the City law that most 
robustly further[s] the purposes of the City statute.”  Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 6 
(emphasis added). 
 98. The bill would “require judges to interpret the local law independently of any 
limitations that may have been imposed on its federal and state counterparts.” Brennan 
Center Statement, supra note 23, at 1 (emphasis added). 
 99. “Intro 22-A requires courts to construe the City’s Human Rights Law independently 
and in light of the Council’s clear intent to provide the greatest possible protection for civil 
rights.”  Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at 4 (emphasis added). 
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statement,100 in the 2005 Committee Report,101 and in Section 1 of the 
Restoration Act itself.102
Because judges have often thought that the existence of similarly or 
identically-worded counterparts is reason enough to ignore the requirement 
of liberal construction, the Restoration Act is careful to state explicitly that 
the need to proceed independently to find the result that best fits the 
purposes of the City Human Rights Law must go forward even where the 
differently-construed federal and state counterparts have provisions 
“comparably-worded to provisions of this title.”
 
103  In the same way that 
Justice Brennan’s 1977 call for independent analysis in the protection of 
rights beyond the level protected federally did not exempt state guarantees 
that linguistically tracked the federal provision,104
What then to do with existing caselaw?  The philosophy of the 
Restoration Act is simply inconsistent with a court hereafter according 
weight to prior federal or state decisions merely because those decisions 
spoke to an aspect of City Human Rights Law (or of comparably-worded 
state or federal law).  Each of the statements specifically brought to the full 
Council’s attention make the point.  “[M]any federal decisions,” according 
to Center testimony, “are not helpful to the interpretative process because 
those decisions themselves give no consideration to principles of liberal 
 so the Restoration Act 
insists on such independent analysis in all circumstances. 
 
 100. “Insisting that our local law be interpreted broadly and independently will safeguard 
New Yorkers at a time when federal and state civil rights protections are in jeopardy.”  
Annabel Palma, Meeting of the New York City Council 41 (Sept. 15, 2005) (transcript on 
file with the New York City Clerk’s Office) (emphasis added). 
 101. The bill “explicitly states that the human rights law must be construed independently 
from both federal and New York State civil and human rights law, including laws with 
comparably worded provisions.”  2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 4-5 (emphasis 
added).  The 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT also incorporates the view expressed by Mayor 
Dinkins in connection with the passage of the 1991 Amendments: “[I]t is the intention of the 
Council that judges interpreting the City’s Human Rights Law are not [to be] bound by 
restrictive state and federal rulings and are to take seriously the requirement that this law be 
liberally and independently construed.”  Id. at 2 (emphasis added; internal citation omitted). 
 102. “In particular, through passage of this local law, the Council seeks to underscore that 
the provisions of New York City’s Human Rights Law are to be construed independently 
from similar or identical provisions of New York state or federal statutes.”  Restoration Act, 
supra note 7, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 103. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 7, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-130. 
 104. Brennan, Protecting Individual Rights, supra note 54, at 500-01 (citing with 
approval the many examples then existing “where state courts have independently 
considered the merits of constitutional arguments and declined to follow opinions of the 
United States Supreme Court they find unconvincing, even where the state and federal 
constitutions are similarly or identically phrased”) (emphasis added).  This point was 
quoted in the Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 8. 
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construction.”105  The Bar Association Letter similarly pointed out that, 
“[j]udges interpreting federal law may not necessarily use this principle of 
liberal construction.”106
In view of the concerns about the pitfalls of importing decisions that 
have interpreted counterpart civil rights statutes, the Restoration Act only 
allows an interpretation of a state or federal civil rights law to be used as an 
“aid in interpretation” of the City Human Rights Law in two ways.  One 
permissible use is insofar as the interpretation of a similarly-worded state 
or federal law is viewed “as a floor below which the City’s Human Rights 
law cannot fall, rather than a ceiling above which the local law cannot 
rise.”
  It bears mention here that another premise of 
McGrath is thus undercut: the fact that a federal or state law has broad 
purposes does not allow the assumption that a decision construing such a 
law has actually considered those purposes. 
107  This provision follows both from the traditional notion of federal 
civil rights protections as a floor,108 and as a consequence of the 
Restoration Act’s aim “to ensure construction of the City’s Human Rights 
Law in line with the purposes of fundamental amendments to the law 
enacted in 1991.”109  The 1991 Amendments, as previously discussed, had 
already seen state and federal law as too constrained, and sought to build 
beyond those constraints.110  As such, the Council knew that while it 
wanted judges to spend significant time considering the outer limits of how 
far the law needed to go to best accomplish its purposes, judges could, in 
general, safely rely on the fact that the Council would not want the local 
law to be any less protective than the most protective posture of federal or 
state law as they existed in 1991 or at any time thereafter.111
 
 105. Center Testimony, supra note 
  In contrast, 
the interpretation of the counterpart law is emphatically not to be used “to 
limit or restrict the provisions of this title from being construed more 
23, at 6. 
 106. Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at 2; see also Brennan Center Statement, 
supra note 23, at 8 (pointing out that “the current habit of automatically relying on 
interpretations of state or federal law is exactly the opposite of the practice recommended by 
Justice Brennan”). 
 107. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 1. 
 108. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-7, 2000a-6(b), 3615, 12201(b) (2005). 
 109. See 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 2. 
 110. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 127-43 and 
accompanying text. 
 111. Because it is theoretically possible (albeit currently wildly unlikely) for a decision 
construing federal law to go further in the protection of federal rights than would be justified 
to fulfill the purposes of the City Human Rights Law, the use of the federal law decision as 
an aid in interpretation is permissive.  See Restoration Act, supra note 8, § 1; cf. Restoration 
Act, supra note 7, § 7 (amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-130) (using the mandatory 
“shall” in describing the obligation to construe the local law to accomplish its uniquely 
broad and remedial purposes). 
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liberally than [the counterpart] laws in order to accomplish the purposes of 
the human rights law . . . .”112
The second permissible use must be inferred from the purpose of the 
construction provision, and from the analysis that underlies the Restoration 
Act.  As underlined in section 8-130 of the revised New York City Human 
Rights Law, the point of the entire exercise is to find the construction that 
best accomplishes law’s purposes.
 
113  As such, it is the persuasive value of 
an opinion that has cogently grappled with how best to achieve the 
purposes of a counterpart civil rights statute that makes it potentially useful 
to the analysis of the local law,114 not the mere fact that the decision 
announced a result.  As Justice Brennan wrote in urging judicial vigilance 
in the defense of civil rights, it is only where decisions construing rights 
guaranteed federally have looked at the relevant policies underlying the 
grant of rights and have considered, in a well-reasoned and logically 
persuasive way, whether the proposed constructions serve those underlying 
policies, that such decisions may “properly claim persuasive weight as 
guideposts” when interpreting counterparts to the federal guarantees.115
These two uses are the only ways that existing caselaw may be validly 
used as precedent.  To restate Justice Brennan’s proposition: those 
decisions that have not looked at the relevant policies, and those decisions 
which have failed to conduct well-reasoned and logically persuasive 
analyses, may not properly claim persuasive weight as guidelines in 
connection with the construction of the City’s Human Rights Law.
 
116
It should not be necessary to belabor further the fact that the Restoration 
Act stands as a rejection for McGrath and its ilk.  The 2005 Committee 
 
 
 112. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5. 
 113. See Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at 2 (the bill “makes it clear that judges 
must consider the legislative intent underlying provisions of the Human Rights Law, and ask 
which interpretation of the law will best fulfill the objectives of the law, rather than 
adopting, as a matter of course, the prevailing interpretation of similar provisions of federal 
or state law”) (emphasis added). 
 114. See Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 5-6 (the reasoning of state and federal 
opinions construing counterpart statutes “like the reasoning contained in law review articles 
and other sources . . . can suggest potential interpretations, and, in some situations, will be 
found to be persuasive by the judge hearing the City Human Rights Law claim”) (emphasis 
in original). 
 115. Brennan, Protecting Individual Rights, supra note 54, at 502. 
 116. One non-precedential use should be added.  While the fact that a particular result 
(“Interpretation A”) arises from a decision that has failed this test means that the decision 
has no precedential value, that fact does not mean that a judge may not consider 
Interpretation A along with plaintiff’s proposed result (“Interpretation B”), defendant’s 
proposed result (“Interpretation C”) (likely Interpretation A in disguise), and the judge’s 
own tentative result (“Interpretation D”).  The judge would not adopt Interpretation A, 
however, unless it was the interpretation that best fulfilled the purposes of the local law. 
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Report specifically states that the amendment to section 8-130 of the New 
York City Human Rights Law is designed to overcome McGrath.117
The Council could have limited itself to the particular substantive and 
procedural fixes discussed in Part II of this article.  It chose not to do so.  It 
saw that the law had been construed too narrowly, that the process of 
narrowing was ongoing, and that even the use of statutory distinct language 
had not been sufficient to protect the law.  It thus developed a solution that 
was designed to accommodate more than the specific fixes set out in other 
sections of the Restoration Act, and more than the numerous other 
problematic areas of law that had been brought to the Council’s attention.
  But it 
is important to note one final aspect of McGrath—its Council-should-just-
fix-specific-provisions theory—and explain why the Restoration Act 
intended that this kind of theory should not again rear its ugly head.  First, 
unlike in 1991, the Council did with the Restoration Act modify a specific 
provision—section 8-130—to reflect its desired mode of construction.  
Second, the design of the Restoration Act completely rebuts McGrath’s 
premise that Council inaction in respect to an unduly narrow judicial 
interpretation of a particular substantive provision of the City Human 
Rights Law can fairly be interpreted as implicit ratification of that judicial 
error. 
  
In short, it developed a process of reflection and reconsideration (the 
requirement of independent construction) that is intended to serve as a 
continuing shield and sword for the City Human Rights Law in all its 
dimensions.118
Nothing in the language of section 8-130 of the New York City Human 
Rights Law limits the requirement of broad and independent construction 
to particular provisions; when the 2005 Committee Report refers to the 
need to defend the “protections” of the City Human Rights Law against 
“restrictive interpretations,” it uses the term “protections” without 
 
 
 117. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 4-5.  Indeed, the version of Intro 22 that 
was ultimately enacted had stronger language than the original, pre-McGrath version.  The 
original version is found at NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS 2004 338-40 (Feb. 4, 
2004).  The characterization of the local law’s purposes as “uniquely broad and remedial” 
was added later, as was the unequivocal statement that local law construction needed to 
proceed “regardless” of how federal or state law had been construed.  2005 COMMITTEE 
REPORT, supra note 22, at 4-5.  The Restoration Act’s first version had no initial “purpose” 
section; only the final version had an initial “purpose” section that underlined both the need 
for independent construction and the idea of comparable civil rights laws as a floor below 
which the City law cannot fall, not a ceiling above which it may not rise.  Id. at 5. 
 118. Cf. N.Y. STAT. LAW § 95 cmt.  (“A statute framed in language of general import, not 
only may be deemed applicable to temporary existing evils, but may be construed to meet 
those which subsequently arise.”). 
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limitation.119  As advocates made clear to the City Council, the revised 
construction provision should obviate the need to fix specific substantive 
provisions over and over again.  “Amendments such as these,” wrote the 
Association of the Bar, “should no longer be necessary after Intro 22-A is 
enacted because Intro 22-A requires courts to construe the City’s Human 
Rights Law independently and in light of the Council’s clear intent to 
provide the greatest possible protection for civil rights.”120
D. Providing Guidance 
 
There is nothing mysterious about what judges need to do to fulfill the 
legislative intent of the Restoration Act.  Step one is to revive the tradition 
of liberal construction that used to prevail routinely.  Step two is to adapt 
that tradition to a statute whose structure, language, and intent all point to a 
body of law far less concerned with preserving the prerogatives of covered 
entities, and far more concerned with preventing and punishing 
discrimination in all its manifestations (and with compensating victims of 
such acts), than are the counterpart federal and state statutes.  Step three is 
to heed the specific guidance generated in connection with the passage of 
the Restoration Act. 
1. Reviving the tradition 
When New York’s Court of Appeals was faced thirty one years ago with 
a city seeking to disclaim responsibility for sex discrimination on the 
grounds that any discrimination acts were attributable only to an 
independent entity, the court would not hear of it: 
Since the statute is to be “construed liberally for the accomplishment of 
the purposes thereof” (Executive Law, § 300), the City of Schenectady 
should not be permitted to avoid responsibility for discriminatory acts of 
persons appointed by it and under a procedure which it itself established, 
pursuant to the labor relations agreement. Sexual discrimination in 
employment being deplorable, it is the duty of courts to make sure that the 
Human Rights Law works and that the intent of the Legislature is not 
thwarted by a combination of strict construction of the statute and a battle 
 
 119. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 2. 
 120. Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at 4.  See also Brennan Center Statement, 
supra note 24, at 7 (“Rather than being reactive—waiting, for example, until after the 
Supreme Court cuts back on standing for testers and fair housing organizations, and then 
waiting further, for the years it frequently takes to achieve a specific legislative 
restoration—Intro 22 will provide a means of preventing such dismantling of New York 
City’s civil rights protections in the first place.”). 
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with semantics.121
Even the United States Supreme Court has—not so long ago—
recognized the importance of looking to the purposes of a statute in 
determining how to construe it.
 
122  It had to decide whether after-acquired 
evidence of serious wrongdoing (that is, that which would have resulted in 
dismissal) should operate in all cases to bar all relief for an earlier violation 
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).123
The ADEA and Title VII share common substantive features and also a 
common purpose: “the elimination of discrimination in the 
workplace.” . . . Congress designed the remedial measures in these 
statutes to serve as a “spur or catalyst” to cause employers “to self-
examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor 
to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges” of discrimination. . . . 
Deterrence is one object of these statutes. Compensation for injuries 
caused by the prohibited discrimination is another.
  Before it could 
reach a conclusion, it needed to look at the purposes of the statutory 
scheme: 
124
Having identified compensation and deterrence as goals of the statute, 
the Court turned to the mechanism used by the statutes to effectuate the 
goals: 
 
The ADEA, in keeping with these purposes, contains a vital element 
found in both Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act: It grants an 
injured employee a right of action to obtain the authorized relief.  29 
U.S.C. § 626(c). The private litigant who seeks redress for his or her 
injuries vindicates both the deterrence and the compensation objectives of 
the ADEA. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45, 94 S. 
Ct. 1011, 1018, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) (“[T]he private litigant [in Title 
VII] not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important 
congressional policy against discriminatory employment  practices”); see 
also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1869, 
52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977).125
The Court concluded that a comprehensive ban on all relief in all cases 
would be contrary to the effective administration of the ADEA: 
 
The objectives of the ADEA are furthered when even a single employee 
establishes that an employer has discriminated against him or her. The 
 
 121. City of Schenectady v. State Div. on Human Rights, 335 N.E.2d 290, 295 (N.Y. 
1975) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
 122. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995). 
 123. Id. at 360. 
 124. Id. at 358 (internal citations omitted). 
 125. Id. 
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disclosure through litigation of incidents or practices that violate national 
policies respecting nondiscrimination in the work force is itself important, 
for the occurrence of violations may disclose patterns of noncompliance 
resulting from a misappreciation of the Act’s operation or entrenched 
resistance to its commands, either of which can be of industry-wide 
significance. The efficacy of its enforcement mechanisms becomes one 
measure of the success of the Act.126
One might disagree with the Court’s ultimate conclusion
 
127
2. Adapting to the enhanced enforcement focus                                            
of the City Human Rights Law 
 but, it is 
clear to see, the exploration of statutory purposes is essential. 
As has already been discussed, a court, seeking to construe a provision 
of the City Human Rights Law, must take account of: (a) the Council’s 
belief that the law has heretofore been construed too narrowly; (b) the fact 
that the purposes of the City Human Rights Law are “uniquely broad and 
remedial; and (c) the Council’s intention that the law be construed “in line 
with the purposes of fundamental amendments to the law enacted in 
1991.”128
What the phrases “uniquely broad and remedial purposes” and 
“fundamental amendments” reflect is the fact that, in 1991, the City Human 
Rights Law shifted decisively away from the “let’s see if we can conciliate 
and become friends” philosophy that animated the first generation of 
modern civil rights statutes.  The City Human Rights Law became instead a 
statute that had at its core traditional law enforcement values. These 
included the belief that deterrence was necessary to maximize compliance, 
and that deterrence could only be achieved: (a) under a regime that 
maximized responsibility for discriminatory acts and concurrently 
minimized the leeway accorded covered entities to evade such 
responsibility; and (b) where non-compliance was seen to have serious 
consequences. 
 
Built into the law was the belief that a system that truly has “zero 
tolerance” for discrimination must punish violations severely, especially 
 
 126. Id. at 358-59. 
 127. Some would argue, for example, that the Court did not adequately address what it 
acknowledged was the “not insubstantial” concern that “employers might as a routine matter 
undertake extensive discovery into an employee’s background or performance on the job to 
resist claims. . . . “  Id. at 363.  The view that Rule 11 sanctions would help to “deter most 
abuses” has proven to be unduly optimistic. 
 128. See Restoration Act, supra note 7, §§1, 7; 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 2. 
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because every act of discrimination is seen to represent an injury not only 
to the individual victim, but to the City as a whole.  Joined to this core 
belief in civil rights enforcement as law enforcement, and, in some 
respects, a function of it, was the view that the needs of victims of 
discrimination are sufficiently important that they trump—in all but the 
most limited circumstances—concerns about any burdens to be placed on 
covered entities. 
Given the scant attention paid by courts to the changes effected by the 
1991 Amendments,129
In fact, any skepticism about the scope of the philosophical change 
represented by those amendments is quickly and simply put to rest by 
reading the 1991 Amendments.
 it may at first seem unlikely that the sea change 
described above actually occurred.  Could it be that the 1991 Amendments 
merely distinguished its local law in a few requests from its state and 
federal counterparts?  If so, one might reasonably infer that the changes 
actually meant that the City was fundamentally satisfied with (and had 
implicitly adopted) the basic principles, assumptions, and concerns of state 
and federal civil rights law. 
130  They were numerous, substantive, and 
dramatic.  They included the creation of two new mechanisms for fighting 
discrimination: one, a private right of action for aggrieved persons; and 
two, vesting of the City’s Law Department with explicit statutory authority 
to investigate and prosecute instances of systemic discrimination.  
Recognizing that discrimination harmed the City itself, the 1991 
Amendments imposed—for cases proven in the administrative context—
civil penalties designed to “vindicate the public interest.”131
Rather than capping compensatory and punitive damages in the manner 
 
 
 129. A rare exception where the existence of the legislative history was noticed was 
Burger v. Litton Industries, No. 91 Civ. 09181996 WL 421449, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 
1996), adopted, No. 91 Civ. 09181996 WL 609421 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1996)) (“the 
‘legislative history’ of the [New York City Human Rights Law] makes clear that it is to be 
even more liberally construed than the federal and state anti-discrimination laws”) (internal 
citation omitted).  Referencing the language in Burger, the Second Circuit, in a case 
frequently cited for the proposition of parallelism, came tantalizingly close the following 
year to grappling with the 1991 Amendments before providing that it “need not consider 
those issues here, as [plaintiff] has not challenged the district court’s dismissal of her state 
and city human rights claims on appeal.”  Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 629 n.1 (2d Cir. 
1997); see also 119-121 East 97th Street Corp. v. N.Y.C. Comm’n on Human Rights, 642 
N.Y.S.2d 638, 644 (App. Div. 1996) (“The legislative history of the amendments to the 
Administrative Code, including the civil penalty provision, indicates that they were intended 
to strengthen and expand the enforcement mechanisms of the law so the Commission could 
prevent discrimination from playing any role in actions related to employment, public 
accommodations, housing and other real estate.”). 
 130. 1991 Amendments, supra note 3; 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3. 
 131. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-126(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 174. 
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of Title VII out of concern for what uncapped awards might mean for 
covered entities, the City defined the private right of action as one that 
included uncapped compensatory and uncapped punitive damages. 
Rather than excluding damages in disparate impact cases and in mixed 
motive cases, as the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did in connection with Title 
VII cases, the City Human Rights Law contains no such exclusion.  The 
1991 Amendments to the City law, however, did include as part of the 
fundamental policy of the law the idea that discrimination must “play no 
role.”132
Disparate impact was explicitly covered in all contexts and in respect to 
all protected classes, with burdens of proof requiring more of a defendant 
than is the case pursuant to federal law.
 
133
Under federal law, a covered entity which has failed to provide 
reasonable accommodation as required by the Americans with Disabilities 
Act is nevertheless sheltered from exposure to damages if it had made good 
faith efforts to identify and make such accommodation.
 
134
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act, 
only those impairments which substantially limit a major life function 
allow a person to meet either statute’s definition of disability.
  The 1991 
Amendments contained no such exemption. 
135
Under the Fair Housing Act, a covered entity is only required to permit a 
person to make reasonable modifications to a dwelling.
  The 1991 
Amendments, by contrast, have no such restriction. 
136  Under the 1991 
Amendments, the covered entity is both obliged to make and pay for such 
modifications, unless to do so would be an undue hardship.137
The 1991 Amendments limited the then-existing exemption to the City 
Law’s fair housing provisions.  Until the 1991 Amendments, rental 
apartments in owner-occupied two-family buildings were not covered by 
the law’s anti-discrimination provisions.  The 1991 Amendments severely 
curtailed that exemption.
 
138
 
 132. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-101.  This was echoed in Mayor David N. Dinkins’ 
remarks on June 18, 1991.  See Mayor David N. Dinkins, Remarks, supra note 
 
4, at 2. 
 133. For example, even when a defendant has shown that a practice “bears a significant 
relationship to a significant business objective,” a plaintiff only has to produce “substantial 
evidence” that “an alternative policy or practice with less disparate impact is available.  The 
defendant bears the burden of persuasion that the alternative policy or practice “would not 
serve the covered entity as well.”  N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(17)(a). 
 134. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (2005). 
    135.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) and 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1), respectively. 
    136.  42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A).  
    137.  See infra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 138. A comparison of the pre-1991 Amendments version of section 8-107(5)(a)(4)(a)(1) 
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Not wanting to permit a covered entity to evade liability by claiming that 
it was unaware of the needs of persons with disabilities, the 1991 
Amendments triggered the obligation to make reasonable accommodation 
to persons with disabilities as soon as the entity should have known of the 
disability, a provision not available under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act.139
The minimum number of employees required for an employer to be 
covered under the City law had been four (meaning that hundreds of 
thousands of New York City workers not covered by Title VII were 
covered by the local law). The 1991 Amendments broadened coverage still 
further by requiring that natural persons not themselves employers who 
were independent contractors for an employer would be counted as 
employees for coverage purposes.
 
140
The 1991 Amendments adopted strict vicarious liability provisions, 
provisions unknown under Title VII.  In the co-employee workplace 
harassment context, the City was not satisfied with imposing vicarious 
liability on the employer where it failed to take “immediate and appropriate 
corrective action” after one of its supervisors or managers learned of the 
discriminatory conduct.
 
141 Employers would also be vicariously liable 
where they should have known about the conduct, but failed to exercise 
reasonable diligence to prevent such conduct.142 For the first time, the City 
even identified circumstances under which employers would also be held 
responsible for conduct of independent contractors.143
As Mayor Dinkins pointed out, a “fundamental step” of the 1991 
amendments was making individuals responsible for their own 
discriminatory conduct.
 
144
 
of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, with its post-1991 Amendments 
counterpart, shows that the exemption is no longer available where the housing 
accommodation is “publicly-assisted,” as broadly defined in section 8-102(11), or where it 
has been publicly advertised, listed, or otherwise offered to the general public.  See 1991 
LEG. ANN., supra note 
 
3, at 156. 
 139. Compare  N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(15)(a) with 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) 
(2005). 
 140. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(5). 
 141. Id. § 8-107(13)(b)(2).  It should be reemphasized that outside the contexts of section 
8-107(1) (employment) and section 8-107(2) (apprentice training program) employers are 
strictly liable for the conduct of all employees or agents, regardless of position, not just for 
those employees or agents who exercise supervisory or managerial authority.  Id. § 8-
107(13)(a). 
 142. Id.§ 8-107(13)(b)(3).  The “duty of care” standard under federal law, looking to 
whether appropriate preventative measures were taken, only applies in the context of 
supervisory or managerial misconduct.   
 143. Id. § 8-107(13)(c). 
 144. Mayor David N. Dinkins, Remarks, supra note 4, at 4-5. 
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Impatient with the litigation that had swirled around the definition of 
what entities would be considered a “place of public accommodation,” the 
1991 Amendments adopted sweeping language covering places or 
providers of “goods, services, facilities, accommodations, advantage or 
privileges of any kind.”145  The message was this: a laundry list of covered 
types of establishments was not enough to encompass the City’s 
overarching goal of preventing discrimination whenever a covered entity 
interacted with a member of the public.146
The changes in administrative procedure also represented a major shift.  
The City believed that discrimination cases had matured to a level well 
beyond the simple and relatively informal process that may have sufficed in 
the 1960s—a time when the routine brazenness of discrimination meant 
that cases were factually simple, a time when a sophisticated discrimination 
defense industry did not yet exist, and a time when the hope for voluntary 
compliance was still strong.  The 1991 Amendments treated the 
administrative process as now deserving of the seriousness of a full-blown 
plenary proceeding, requiring timely answers, authorizing demands for 
record production and retention, placing the “prosecutorial bureau” of the 
Commission on Human Rights in the role of party to all administrative 
complaints, contemplating full pre-trial discovery and the ability to compel 
discovery, and providing that the Commission could impose civil penalties 
for the violation of its orders (in addition to enforcing its orders through 
court action).
 
147
*  *  * 
 
The 1991 Amendments were consistent in tone and approach: every 
change either expanded coverage, limited an exemption, increased 
responsibility, or broadened remedies.  In case after case, the balance 
struck by the Amendments favored victims and the interests of enforcement 
over the claimed needs of covered entities in ways materially different from 
those incorporated into state and federal law.  In view of this strong pattern, 
interpretations of “open” areas of law are only fairly construed consistent 
with the spirit that animated that pattern. 
 
 145. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9). 
 146. This description of amendments is only a partial one.  Among others: elimination of 
a previously existing exemption for many educational institutions; the broadening of the 
proscription against retaliation to proscribe retaliation “in any manner”; and a new 
proscription against marital status discrimination in the employment context. 
 147. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-111, 8-114, 8-117, 8-118, 8-125; 1991 LEG. ANN., supra 
note 3, at 168-71, 174. 
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3. Acting in compliance with guidance                                          
specifically related to the Restoration Act 
The guidance on how to carry out liberal construction in the manner 
intended by the Restoration Act is clear and consistent.  The Anti-
Discrimination Center’s testimony referenced the principles described in 
the preceding section, including the need to maximize coverage and 
counteract evasion.148  The Brennan Center, identifying the “stronger law 
enforcement focus provided by the local law,” explained that the task was 
to construe the law bearing these purposes in mind.149  The Bar Association 
pointed to the City Council’s “clear intent to provide the greatest possible 
protection for civil rights.”150
The 2005 Committee Report echoes these concerns when discussing 
how judges should approach issues of interpretation arising under the 
construction provision of City Human Rights Law.  The Report says that 
decision makers should be guided by certain principles.  The first principle 
specified is that “discrimination should not play a role in decisions made by 
employers, landlords, and providers of public accommodations”; the 
second is that “traditional methods and principles of law enforcement ought 
to be applied in the civil rights context”; and the third is that “victims of 
discrimination suffer serious injuries for which they ought to receive full 
compensation.”
 
151
 
 148. See Center Testimony, supra note 
  The Report concludes with an explanation of the 
importance of the civil penalties being enhanced by the Restoration Act, an 
explanation encapsulating the Council’s “zero tolerance” policy: the 
imposition of penalties, according to the Report, “sends a strong signal to 
those who discriminate that such acts cause serious injury, to both the 
persons directly involved and the social fabric of the city as a whole, which 
23, at 5 (citing the need to: “(a) maximize the 
coverage provided by the law; (b) make certain that discrimination plays no role in the 
various decisions made each day in New York City by employers, landlords, and providers 
of public accommodations; (c) strictly limit the zone in which discrimination may be 
practiced; (d) maximize the deterrent effect of the law, with the recognition that traditional 
methods and principles of law enforcement should be applicable in the civil rights context; 
(e) minimize and counteract evasion of the law, including attempts to feign ignorance of the 
requirements of the law, or otherwise to engage in diversionary legal tactics; (f) always 
compensate victims of discrimination fully; (g) maximize access to the courts; and (h) treat 
discrimination injuries as serious injuries both to the individual victim, and to New York 
City.”). 
 149. Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at. 4. 
 150. Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at 4. 
 151. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5.  The Report also insists that there 
must always be “thoughtful, independent consideration of whether the proposed 
interpretation would fulfill the uniquely broad and remedial purposes of the City’s human 
rights law.”  Id. at 5, n.8. 
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will not be tolerated.”152
One cannot review the Council’s recitation that the City Human Rights 
Law had been construed too narrowly, the Council’s characterization of the 
law’s purposes as being “uniquely broad and remedial,” the Council’s goal 
of vindicating the purposes of the 1991 Amendments, the relentless 
broadening of those amendments, the testimony on which the Council 
relied, and the other aspects of the Restoration Act’s legislative history, 
without emerging with the clear sense that any doubts about the 
interpretation of the law should be resolved in favor of giving the law the 
broadest and most powerful reach that is possible.  Consistent with this 
approach, any exemptions to the law’s coverage must be construed 
narrowly.
 
153
E. Maintaining Judicial Independence 
  Application of these considerations to more than a dozen 
illustrations of areas of the law is covered in Section F of this article.  First 
though, it is important to set out explicitly the Restoration Act’s respect 
for—and consistency with—principles of judicial independence. 
The legislative history makes clear that the Restoration Act is not in any 
way designed to place judges in a straightjacket, but rather, is designed to 
combat the mischief of rote parallelism, and to remind, empower, and 
require judges to fulfill their essential role as active and zealous agents for 
the vindication of the purposes of the law.  The expectations of and for the 
Restoration Act were expressed consistently.  The Bar Association pointed 
out, for example, that the Act “does not preclude judges from adopting the 
prevailing interpretation of federal law . . . so long as they conclude that the 
federal interpretation best serves the broad remedial purposes of the Human 
Rights Law.”154 The key is taking the time to engage in the process of 
asking “which interpretation of the law will best fulfill the objectives of the 
law.”155
The Brennan Center observed that “[i]t is a fundamental task of a court 
to use its best judgment to determine [which interpretation] best fulfills the 
purpose of the statute under examination.  The provision of Intro 22 in 
 
 
 152. Id. at 6. 
 153. See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 526, 531-32 (1995) (“[W]e 
are mindful of the [Fair Housing Act’s] stated policy ‘to provide, within constitutional 
limitations, for fair housing within the United States.  We also note precedent recognizing 
the FHA’s ‘broad and inclusive’ compass, and therefore according a ‘generous construction’ 
to the Act’s complaint-filing provision.  Accordingly, we regard this case as an instance in 
which an exception to ‘a general statement of policy’ is sensibly read ‘narrowly in order to 
preserve the primary operation of the [policy.]’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 154. Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at, 2. 
 155. Id. 
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question requires a court to do nothing more than engage in that process 
with due regard for the underlying purposes of the law.”156
The Anti-Discrimination Center’s testimony made this same point: “The 
bill does not oblige a judge to accept a particular argument that an advocate 
is advancing, but it does insist that judges thoughtfully consider whether 
the interpretation being advanced, or a different one, would address the 
purposes of the City Human Rights Law most robustly.”
 
157  In language 
almost identical to that testimony, the 2005 Committee Report noted that, 
“The bill does not require a decision maker to accept any particular 
argument being advanced by an advocate, but underscores the need for 
thoughtful, independent consideration of whether the proposed 
interpretation would fulfill the uniquely broad and remedial purposes of the 
City’s Human Rights Law.”158
In an era where the phrase “judicial restraint” is frequently used more as 
a term of approbation than one that has reliable meaning, it is important to 
decode the ways in which the Restoration Act expects and does not expect 
judges to exercise restraint.  Restraint is expected both in resisting the urge 
towards rote parallelism, and in respect to not substituting a judge’s own, 
more conservative set of social policy decisions for the policy judgments 
made by the Council.  On the other hand, activism is expected in seeing that 
the law as interpreted fulfills its extraordinarily broad intended reach.
 
159
When construing a statute that is effectively “new territory” because of 
the absence of serious work to construe it heretofore; that announces that 
“there is no greater danger to the health, morals, safety and welfare of the 
city” than discrimination;
 
160 that describes discrimination as “menac[ing] 
the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state”;161 and that 
insists that discrimination be proscribed “from playing any role in actions 
relating to employment, public accommodations, and housing,”162 it is well 
to consider what a Supreme Court—very different in composition from 
today’s Court—did in the early days after the enactment of the Fair 
Housing Act.  In surveying what was then also new territory, citing the fact 
that the language of the Fair Housing Act was “broad and inclusive”163
 
 156. Brennan Center Statement, supra note 
 and 
was intended to vindicate “a policy that Congress considered to be of the 
23, at 9. 
 157. Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 5. 
 158. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5 n.8. 
 159. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 160. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-101. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). 
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highest priority,”164 that Court concluded that “only a generous 
construction” of its provisions would give vitality to those provisions and 
carry out the purposes of the statute.165
F. Illustrations of the Intended Construction Principles 
  In passing the Restoration Act, the 
Council was depending on the judiciary to play a comparable role today. 
As the City Human Rights Law is hereafter used, there will emerge 
numerous areas for interpretation beyond those brought to the Council’s 
attention.  This fact should not operate to suggest any limitation of the 
liberal construction principles that are the focus of this article.166
1. First order of business 
  
Nevertheless, there were quite a few areas of concern that did animate the 
Restoration Act, and an examination of those is instructive, both for the 
particular resolution intended, and for their illustrative value. 
Four cases were consistently identified by name as inconsistent with 
statutory language and purposes: McGrath, Levin, Forrest, and Priore.  
Council Member Palma’s statement regarding the intent and consequences 
of the bill stated flatly: “With Intro 22, these cases, and others like them, 
will no longer hinder vindication of our civil rights.”167
 
 164. Id. at 211. 
  The areas of law to 
 165. Id. at 212. 
 166. Cf. Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir 1972).  In that case, the D.C. Circuit, 
empanelled en banc, treated a question not specifically addressed in the Fair Housing Act: 
did the Act cover a Recorder of Deeds who had been accepting and filing racially restrictive 
covenants?  The lead concurrence began by acknowledging that “there is nothing in the 
legislative history tending either to support or to refute the inference arising from the 
language that the Act prohibits statements of racial preference emanating from the 
Recorder’s office,” and by noting that, “[i]n all likelihood, few congressmen even addressed 
their thinking to this particular problem.”  Id. at 634.  That acknowledgment, however, did 
not operate as evidence that coverage should not lie: “no court has ever held that Congress 
must specifically indicate how a statute should be applied in every case before the judiciary 
can go about the business of applying it.”  Id. at 634.  The opinion pointed to a then-recent 
Supreme Court decision which had recognized that: 
“[M]ost Congressional discussion of the public accommodations of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 had focused on places of spectator entertainment, not 
recreational areas.”  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court had held the Act applicable 
to a lake club with boating and dancing facilities, remarking that the Act’s 
coverage should not be “restricted to the primary objects of Congress’ concern” 
since the purpose of the law was “to remove the daily affront and humiliation 
involved in discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the 
general public.” 
Id. at 634–35.  The Ridley Court, too, was unwilling to restrict the reach of the Fair Housing 
Act to “the primary objects of Congress’ concern.” Id. at 634. 
 167. Each of these four cases was also cited as an example of improper judicial 
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which these cases (erroneously) spoke are treated first. 
i. McGrath: Attorneys fees in “nominal damages” cases 
In rejecting McGrath’s importation of Farrar and making clear that 
attorney’s fees are available in cases that result in only nominal damages, 
courts will (1) avoid importing a restriction not mentioned by the language 
of the City Human Rights Law and not contemplated by the 1991 
Amendments, (2) further the ability of victims of discrimination to secure 
counsel, and (3) thereby vindicate the statute’s intent to see that no instance 
of discrimination is allowed to stand unchallenged.  The phrase “victim of 
discrimination” is deliberate: the only people being denied fees under the 
McGrath/Farrar rule are those who have proved to a jury’s satisfaction that 
the defendant did engage in an unlawful discriminatory practice.168
ii. Levin: Marital status 
 
Consider the following exchange between a landlord and a couple to 
whom he has shown an available apartment: 
Landlord: Did you like it? 
Couple: We did.  We’d like to rent it. 
Landlord: Are you married? 
Couple: No. 
Landlord: Well, because you are not married, I will not rent the 
apartment to you. 
Couple: Is there any other reason? 
Landlord: No. 
One might think that this is a straightforward single-motive, intentional 
discrimination case.  The City Human Rights Law has long prohibited 
housing discrimination on the basis of marital status.169
 
construction.  See Bar Association Letter, supra note 
  As early as 1977, 
the City Human Rights Commission considered the argument of a landlord 
who “believed that unmarried persons planning to live together would be 
23, at 1 n.1; Brennan Center 
Statement, supra note 23, at 3 n.4, 5 n.6, and 6 n.8; Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 2 
nn.1-4. 
 168. It is true that the most harsh effects of Farrar can theoretically be avoided in federal 
court if the plaintiff seeks and is granted equitable relief, although in McGrath, such relief 
was not sought.  Leaving aside the infrequency with which such relief is granted in an 
individual case where only nominal money damages are awarded, there is an additional 
problem for cases brought in state court.  New York has a rule that strongly discourages the 
inclusion of a demand for equitable relief: the plaintiff who does so loses the right to a jury 
trial. 
 169. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(5)(a)(1).  The provision was added in 1973. 
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more likely to have financial difficulties culminating in the breaking of 
their lease than would married persons living together.”170
It was subjective decisions of this very type, so clearly mired on 
preconceived stereotypical attitudes, which served to make finding 
housing so great a problem for unmarried people, and which was in large 
part responsible for the legislative enactment under which this 
Commission’s jurisdiction has been involved in this case.
  The 
Commission rejected the argument: 
171
New York’s highest court, however, has seen things differently.  In 
rulings most recently affirmed in Levin v. Yeshiva University, the Court of 
Appeals has held that protection against being intentionally discriminated 
against on the basis of marital status only applies to an individual who has 
been discriminated against, not to persons who have been discriminated 
against because of a “disqualifying relationship.”
 
172
The court did not consider the fact that the City Human Rights Law 
provision in question states that a housing provider is forbidden to withhold 
or deny housing “from any person or group of persons” based on the 
protected class status (including marital status) of “such person or 
persons,”
  In the court’s 
conception, “marital status” corresponds only to the box an individual 
would check off on a form. 
173 and did not consider that the common understanding of 
“marital status” encompasses the status of a couple.174  In the illustrative 
conversation cited above, for example, it would be the very unusual 
landlord who would have been satisfied with the answer “Yes, each of us is 
a ‘married person,’” if the two people were having an affair (and were only 
married persons in the sense of being married to others).  In the real world, 
the landlord was asking, “Are you married to one another?”175
 
 170. Mandel v. Reinhart, No. 6481-H, 1977 WL 52818, at *7 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., 
Feb. 28, 1977) (decision and order). 
 
 171. Id. at *7. 
 172. Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d 1099, 1102 (N.Y. 2001)).  As was pointed out 
in Center testimony, the case did not purport to analyze the right of an unmarried individual 
to be free from intentional discrimination in the terms and conditions of a rental or sale, and 
did not purport to deal with disparate impact claims.  Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 2 
n.2. 
 173. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(5)(a)(1). 
 174. Cf. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm’n., 12 Cal. 4th 1143, 1155 (Sup. Ct. 
1996) (“To determine what a statute means, ‘we first consult the words themselves, giving 
them their usual and ordinary meaning.’  The usual and ordinary meaning of the words 
‘marital status,’ as applied to two prospective tenants is that a landlord may not ask them 
whether they are married or refuse to rent to them because they are, or are not.”) (internal 
citation and footnote omitted). 
 175. In the course of more than two years of work on what became the Restoration Act, 
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Not surprisingly, the Court did not–either in Levin or in the predecessor 
cases–consider what interpretation of marital status would best fulfill the 
purposes of the statute, nor did it consider the City Human Rights Law 
independently of its consideration of the State Human Rights Law.  A rule 
that only prohibits a landlord from excluding all unmarried persons 
(regardless of whether they are living alone or together) leaves a great deal 
of room for the kind of stereotypical assumptions about marital status to 
play a role in decisions relating to housing, the very assumptions that had 
long ago been condemned by the Commission on Human Rights. 
The Council specifically contemplated that Levin could not stand in the 
face of the expanded and revived liberal construction provision, and 
anticipated that courts would be obliged to strike it down.  In the meantime, 
the Council added protection for registered domestic partners,176 but that 
protection is only an “interim measure.”177  As the 2005 Committee Report 
put it, the domestic partnership protection was being enacted “[p]ending 
judicial reconsideration of the proper scope of protection from 
discrimination based on marital status. . . . “178
The decision to create an interim solution arose from objections that had 
been raised by the Bloomberg Administration to the language in the 
original version of the bill.  That language had defined marital status to 
include the status of a person “in relation to another person,” without any 
qualification whatsoever as to the nature of the relationship between the 
two people involved.
 
179  The Bloomberg Administration repeatedly 
denounced the proposed provision as unintentionally extending protections 
far beyond the Council’s desire to stop discrimination against unmarried 
couples.180
 
and conversations with literally hundreds of people, the task of explaining the Court’s 
conception of marital status was more difficult than anything else.  Each and every person 
found the Court’s cramped interpretation of marital status either entirely counterintuitive or 
incomprehensible, or both. 
  The Council’s solution, as noted above, was to have the courts 
 176. See infra notes 311-13 and accompanying text. 
 177. Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 7 (pointing out that “the broader question will 
have to be revisited after the courts have re-examined their previous marital status rulings in 
light of each and all of the requirements of revised Section 8-130”). 
 178. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 2. 
 179. See Intro 439 of 2003 (the predecessor bill to Intro 22), NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL 
PROCEEDINGS 1518 (2003) and the original version of Intro 22, NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL 
PROCEEDINGS 338 (2004). 
 180. The Commission on Human Rights first claimed that the language “extends the law 
to protect based upon personality traits, individual qualities and characteristics.”  Comm’r 
Patricia Gatling, New York City Commission on Human Rights, Statement at Hearing of 
New York City Council Committee on General Welfare 2 (Oct. 16, 2003) (on file with 
Committee on General Welfare).  A year later, the Commission still thought the language 
was too broad: 
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draw the parameters of “couples” protection as part of the judiciary’s 
liberal construction function.181
The task is one that the courts should readily be able to handle.  In 
Braschi v. Stahl Co., for example, New York’s Court of Appeals was faced 
with the problem of how to define “family” for the purpose of determining 
who has survivor protection from eviction pursuant to the rent control 
laws.
 
182  In that case, the Court of Appeals recognized that statutes are to 
be interpreted “so as to avoid objectionable consequences and to prevent 
hardship or injustice,”  and that, “where doubt exists as to the meaning of a 
term, and a choice between two constructions is afforded, the consequences 
that may result from the different interpretations should be considered.”183  
The court went on to point out that, “since rent-control laws are remedial in 
nature and designed to promote the public good, their provisions should be 
interpreted broadly to effectuate their purposes.”184
The court concluded that the term “family” 
 
should not be rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized their 
relationship by obtaining, for instance, a marriage certificate or an 
adoption order.  The intended protection against sudden eviction should 
not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead 
should find its foundation in the reality of family life.  In the context of 
eviction, a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family 
includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and 
characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and 
interdependence. This view comports both with our society’s traditional 
concept of “family” and with the expectations of individuals who live in 
 
I’m still not clear on what the class of people are.  I’ll give you an example: 
Before I got married, I had a roommate for 12 years.  We lived in an apartment 
together.  We shared household expenses.  We even had a summer house that we 
rented together with a group of other people.  That I assume would not be the type 
of relationship you’re looking to protect.  Yet the way this is written or the way I 
understand the proposal as the definition of marital status.  I would think that’s 
inappropriate. 
Clifford Mulqueen, General Counsel, New York City Commission on Human Rights, 
Testimony at Hearing of New York City Council Committee on General Welfare 73-74 
(Sept. 22, 2004) (transcript on file with the New York City Clerk’s Office). 
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 172-74.  While the Council did step back from 
its initial language protecting even two people with the most tenuous ties between them, 
there is, of course, no evidence that the Council was seeking to narrow the scope that the 
existing marital status provision would have given to unmarried couples had the Levin court 
paid heed to the intentions of the framers of the 1991 Amendments, nor any evidence that 
the Council wanted to exempt marital status from the enhanced liberal construction 
requirements of the Restoration Act. 
 182. Braschi v. Stahl Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 50–51 (N.Y. 1989). 
 183. Id. at 52. 
 184. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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such nuclear units.185
After the court had acted, the holding was codified in regulation, and 
affords protection where there is a showing of “emotional and financial 
commitment, and interdependence” between the two people involved.
 
186  
In the context of marital status protection for couples, the same principles 
referenced in Braschi demand, at minimum, that couples who hold 
themselves out as “partners” (that is, two people with an emotional and 
financial commitment to, and interdependence between, each other) be 
protected as couples against discrimination.187
iii. Forrest: Vicarious liability 
 
As discussed above in part I.B.3, and as described to the Council, 
Forrest disregarded the distinct language and legislative history of the 1991 
Amendments which had established strict employer liability for the acts of 
employees who exercised supervisory or managerial responsibility.  The 
case also disregarded the fact that the affirmative defense available under 
the City Human Rights Law was narrower than that available under the 
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense the Supreme Court later created in 
1998.  The City Law, after all, treated an employer’s “reasonable steps to 
prevent” as only being relevant to liability in non-supervisory, non-
managerial harassment situations.  Neither Forrest’s importation of a state 
vicarious liability standard contrary to the express language of the City 
Law, nor the case’s importation of a federal affirmative defense 
inconsistent with the City Law, can have continuing vitality. 
iv. Priore: Individual liability 
As pointed out to the Council, this, too, is an area where a court simply 
refused to apply the language of the law.188
 
 185. Id. at 53–54 (emphasis added). 
  Most other courts had 
previously recognized that the Council, having proscribed in 1991 
discrimination not only by an employer, but by “an employee or agent 
thereof,” meant that discrimination by employees or agents of employers 
was also to be prohibited.  If the First Department had thought that the 
Council had not really meant to move beyond the proscriptions of State 
 186. New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, 
§ 2204.6(d) (1993). 
 187. Independent of what comes to be done in terms of protecting couples as couples, it 
bears repetition that Levin did not foreclose claims by an unmarried individual that he or she 
was being discriminated against in terms and conditions either intentionally or as a matter of 
disparate impact. 
 188. See Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 6. 
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law,189
2. Key challenges
 the Restoration Act makes that belief impossible to sustain, and 
Priore must be abandoned. 
190
i. Abandoning the “severe or pervasive” requirement in harassment cases 
 
An employer has two high-paid employees in a particular department, 
one man and one woman.  The employer tells the woman that, because of 
her gender, she will henceforth be paid ten cents less per hour than her 
male counterpart.  Though the gross economic loss (assuming a fifty hour 
week) is only five dollars per week (less, after taxes), the woman would be 
able to tell her employer with confidence that the employer’s action is 
prohibited pursuant to Title VII.  “I am entitled,” she says, “not to be 
discriminated against in the terms and conditions of my employment.”  The 
fact that her out-of-pocket damages are small does not undercut the fact 
that a gender-based distinction in terms and conditions has been effected.  
In other words, liability is one issue and damages another. 
When it comes to harassment claims, however, the courts conflate the 
issues of liability and damages.  As most recently summarized by the 
Supreme Court in Clark County School District v. Breeden, “sexual 
harassment is actionable under Title VII only if it is so severe or pervasive 
as to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an 
abusive working environment.”191  The Court went on to underline the fact 
that a “recurring point in [our] opinions is that simple teasing, offhand 
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not 
amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of 
employment.’”192
The “severe or pervasive” rule invited lower courts to “discriminate 
against one term or condition of employment by assigning a significantly 
 
 
 189. This belief had no basis in fact.  See infra notes 75–90  and accompanying text. 
 190. The illustrations that follow are not designed to suggest that other issues brought to 
the Council’s attention are not important for courts to examine.  For example, the scope of 
what constitutes “adverse action” needs to be reexamined.  A restrictive interpretation both 
undermines enforcement of the statute, and is inconsistent with the concerns that animated 
the Council’s elimination of the materiality requirement in retaliation cases.  The parameters 
of the “continuing violation” doctrine need to be explored anew, especially since, as of the 
1991 Amendments—and, indeed, until the Supreme Court’s decision in National Rail Road 
Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002)—there was a split among the circuits in terms 
of the applicability of continuing violation theory, even under Title VII. 
 191. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 192. Id. at 271. 
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lower importance to the right to work in an atmosphere free from 
discrimination.”193
In a recent case in New York,
  As a result, there is a wide range of conduct—all of it 
treating one person less well than another because of gender—which courts 
tolerate. 
194 for example, a plaintiff had alleged 
that, in the course of a five month period, the defendant’s vice-president 
(who was also head of the sales department): had repeatedly told her–in the 
presence of other employees–that she was “sleeping with the wrong 
employee”;195 had photographed himself at a party “placing his hand on 
[plaintiff’s] upper thigh and pulling her skirt up two or three inches”; had 
twice said in the presence of other employees that he should accompany 
plaintiff on vacation (instead of her boyfriend); had, on about half-a-dozen 
occasions, approached plaintiff from behind while she was working and 
“placed his hands on her back, neck or shoulders and leaned into her”; had 
at least one conversation with plaintiff about how “hot” she was and “the 
type of underwear she wore”; and, after a partition was, at plaintiff’s 
request, installed around her desk to protect her from the vice-president, 
who would “leer” at plaintiff as he went by her workspace.196
The judge, citing the fact that the conduct occurred “intermittently” over 
a five or six-month period, concluded that it was “not particularly 
‘frequent’ under the Title VII standard.”
 
197
Characterizing the conduct to which plaintiff alleged she was subjected 
as “occasional touching, rude comments, and hostile stares,”
 
198 the judge 
concluded that this conduct “cannot be said to amount to more than 
‘relatively innocuous incidences of overbearing or provocative behavior.’ 
As such, they do not reach the requisite level of employment-altering 
severity.”199
As detailed in License to Harass, trivialization of harassment as seen in 
Schiano is a frequent occurrence, and there are a variety of techniques used 
to insulate employers from liability for conduct that treats women poorly 
 
 
 193. Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual 
Harassment to be “Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates Among “Terms and Conditions” of 
Employment, 62 MD. L. REV. 85, 87 (2003). 
 194. Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., No. 03CV492(DRH)(ETB), 2005 WL 
1638167 (E.D.N.Y. July 12, 2005). 
 195. The vice-president apparently knew that plaintiff was “romantically involved” with 
a co-employee.  Id. at *1. 
 196. Id. at *1-2. 
 197. Id. at *4. 
 198. Id. at *5. 
 199. Id. 
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merely because they are women.200  These include requiring that the 
conduct be severe and pervasive (instead of severe or pervasive), and 
include the phenomenon of courts “tolerating conduct that would be 
considered sexual assault or attempted sexual assault under the criminal 
law” and requiring “proof that the conduct tangibly affected the plaintiff’s 
job performance.”201 Other techniques include parsing evidence to avoid a 
finding of severe or pervasive; and rejecting “evidence of harassment that 
occurred before the employer took some remedial action even though it 
does not stop the harassment.”202
While the Supreme Court sees the “severe or pervasive” standard as 
important to preventing “Title VII from expanding into a general civility 
code,”
 
203
In fact, at the time the 1991 Amendments were being considered and 
enacted, the City Commission on Human Rights had questioned the 
prevailing federal standard.  In 1989, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
of the Commission had made a post-hearing recommendation that the 
Commission dismiss a case that had revolved around one alleged incident 
of harassment, and the Commission affirmed the view of its Law 
Enforcement Bureau that the ALJ had “applied the wrong standard” for 
determining liability in a sexual harassment case, stating: “The Bureau 
correctly notes that the Commission is not bound by federal civil rights 
law.  The New York City Human Rights Law is a separate and independent 
statute.  Indeed, in many instances the City’s law provides victims of 
discrimination with broader protection than that provided by federal 
law.”
 the focus of the City Human Rights Law in light of the 1991 
Amendments and the Restoration Act is different.  Its focus is instead 
making certain that discrimination not play any role in the workplace or 
elsewhere. 
204  The Commission remanded the case to the ALJ for further 
consideration of the “proper standard.”205
On remand, the ALJ explained that he agreed that, if proven, “[a] single 
act of harassment . . . would be sufficient to constitute sexual harassment,” 
but because his decision was based on a determination that the complainant 
was not credible, he again recommended that the case be dismissed.
 
206
 
 200. Johnson, supra note 
 
193, at 111–34. 
 201. Id. at 111, 115. 
 202. Id. at 111, 115, 131-33. 
 203. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 
 204. Murphy v. John Foleros King Pub, No. 03124079-EP, slip op. at 2 (N.Y.C. Com. 
Hum. Rts., Oct. 12, 1989) (decision and order) (on file with the library of New York City’s 
Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH)). 
 205. Id. at 2-3. 
 206. It was alleged that a proprietor of the defendant had put his hand up the 
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When the Commission reviewed the recommendation in April of 1990, the 
Commission rejected it, citing “complex and important credibility issues,” 
and decided to constitute a panel of three Commissioners to “consider and 
suggest guidelines for hearing and deciding sexual harassment cases.”207
No further action was taken prior to the 1991 Amendments, and, thus at 
the time of their enactment, there was an open question to be considered by 
the Commission as to what standard to apply in light of the fact that the 
City Human Rights Law is a “separate and independent statute.”  Sadly, 
this matter was not ultimately considered–in 1994, early in the Giuliani 
Administration, the Commission decided that a further hearing was not 
necessary.  It did so simply as a matter of agreeing that the complainant had 
not presented sufficient credible evidence, not as an analysis of the legal 
standard.
 
208
The need to address this issue was argued to the Council during the 
consideration of the Restoration Act by multiple parties in connection with 
the need for enhanced liberal construction language.
 
209
 
complainant’s skirt.  Murphy v. John Foleros King Pub, No. 03124079-EP, slip op. at 2 
(N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., Mar. 6, 1990) (recommended decision and order on remand) (on 
file with the library of New York City’s Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings 
(OATH)). 
  A simple solution 
(one that neither turns the City Human Rights Law into a general civility 
code nor a shield for discriminators) would adopt a standard which attaches 
liability whenever the covered entity is shown to have treated the plaintiff 
less favorably than others because of a protected status—regardless of the 
level of pervasiveness or severity of the discriminatory harassment —
unless a covered entity demonstrated as an affirmative defense that the 
discriminatory harassment complained of consisted of no more than what a 
reasonable victim of discrimination would consider petty slights and trivial 
 207. Murphy v. John Foleros King Pub, No. 03124079-EP, slip op. at 3-4 (N.Y.C. Com. 
Hum. Rts., Apr. 25, 1990) (en banc) (decision and order) (on file with the library of New 
York City’s Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH)). 
 208. Murphy v. John Foleros King Pub, Complaint 03124079-EP (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. 
Rts., May 26, 1994) (decision and order) (on file with the library of New York City’s Office 
of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH)). 
 209. See Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 5 (complaining that “without any 
consideration of what standard would best further the purposes of the City Law, women 
who have been sexually harassed are routinely thrown out of court without getting a chance 
to have a jury hear their claims because a judge uses the federal standard that they have not 
been harassed enough”); Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 2 (“We have long had the 
problem of judges insisting that harassment [has] to be ‘severe or pervasive’ before it is 
actionable, even though such a requirement unduly narrows the reach of the law.”); Kathryn 
Lake Mazierski, President, New York State National Organization for Women, Testimony 
at Hearing of the New York City Council’s Comm’n on Gen. Welfare 50 (Sept. 22, 2004) 
(transcript on file with New York City Clerk’s Office) (noting that the federal standard 
“continually hurts women”). 
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annoyances. 
The elimination of the “severe or pervasive” requirement, coupled with 
the addition of a burden shift, would tackle the real issue: too many judges 
are unwilling to allow juries to evaluate contested issues in the sexual 
harassment context, preferring to arrogate the fact-determining role unto 
themselves (via the improper granting of motions for summary judgment).  
If a defendant had the burden of persuasion that the conduct complained of 
consisted of “no more than petty slights and trivial annoyances,” summary 
judgment would be improvidently granted far less frequently than it is now.  
As the Second Circuit has recently reaffirmed, 
A party faces a significantly heightened standard to obtain judgment as a 
matter of law on an issue as to which that party bears the burden of proof. 
“It is rare that the party having the burden of proof on an issue at trial is 
entitled to a directed verdict.”  Granite Computer Leasing Corp. v. 
Travelers Indem. Co., 894 F.2d 547, 551 (2d Cir.1990). Indeed, “[a] 
verdict should be directed in such instances only if the evidence in favor 
of the movant is so overwhelming that the jury could rationally reach no 
other result.”  Id.  See also Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 
101, 109 (2d Cir. 2001); 9 Moore’s Federal Practice § 50.05 (2004) 
(“[G]ranting judgment as a matter of law for a party who bears the burden 
of proof is an extreme step that may be taken only when the evidence 
favoring the movant is so one-sided that, absent adequate evidentiary 
response by the nonmovant, it could not be disbelieved by a reasonable 
jury.”).210
This result will not please all stakeholders, but its appropriateness is 
measured, as with other areas of the law, by how competing values are to 
be properly weighed.  For some judges, for example, the most pressing 
concern may be that, if summary judgment motions are not readily granted, 
“we are allowing disgruntled employees to impose the costs of trial on 
employers who, although they have not acted with the intent to 
discriminate, may have treated their employees unfairly.”
 
211  A very 
different value system acknowledges that “the hostile judicial climate in 
relation to [sexual harassment] claims means that many victims of sexual 
harassment never step forward.  Many of [those] who do are usually 
informed by attorneys that the way the law stands now, their claims will 
not be taken seriously.”212
The pattern of the City Human Rights Law—its preferred method of 
balancing or weighing values—is to focus its concern on removing the 
 
 
 210. Fairbrother v. Morrison, 412 F.3d 39, 53 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 211. Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986, 1003 (3d Cir. 1997) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 212. Mazierski, supra note 209, at 48-49. 
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inhibitions that prevent victims from coming forward, and to accept the 
cost of trial for covered entities as a necessary price of doing everything 
possible to eliminate all forms of discrimination.  And in this particular 
area, as the Second Circuit has noted, it is especially important that juries 
get to play their role: 
Today, while gender relations in the workplace are rapidly evolving, and 
views of what is appropriate behavior are diverse and shifting, a jury 
made up of a cross-section of our heterogeneous communities provides 
the appropriate institution for deciding whether borderline situations 
should be characterized as sexual harassment and retaliation. 
The factual issues in this case cannot be effectively settled by a decision 
of an Article III judge on summary judgment. Whatever the early life of a 
federal judge, she or he usually lives in a narrow segment of the 
enormously broad American socio-economic spectrum, generally lacking 
the current real-life experience required in interpreting subtle sexual 
dynamics of the workplace based on nuances, subtle perceptions, and 
implicit communications.213
Disaggregating liability and damages in the manner suggested will still 
allow covered entities the tools needed to defend themselves against truly 
trivial charges and against damages out of proportion to the harm suffered, 
but will make an important contribution to the fight to eliminate gender-
based discrimination—regardless of whether that discrimination manifests 
itself in pay disparities, promotional disparities, or harassment. 
 
ii. No artificial limits on reasonable accommodation 
The Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision constituting a significant blow 
against the rights of people with disabilities, ruled in 1998 that it is 
“fundamental” that the Fair Housing Act “addresses the accommodation of 
handicaps, not the alleviation of economic disadvantages that may be 
correlated with having handicaps.”214
The Second Circuit majority thought this sort of accommodation was not 
contemplated by the Fair Housing Act: “What stands between these 
plaintiffs and the apartments [at issue] is a shortage of money, and nothing 
 The case involved plaintiffs who 
alleged that they were unable to work because they were disabled, and thus 
needed the assistance of the federal Section 8 program.  The 
accommodation requested was a waiver of the landlord’s policy against 
allowing Section 8 tenants. 
 
 213. Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 214. Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 301 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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else.”215  For the majority, the Fair Housing Act did not “elevate the rights 
of the handicapped poor over the rights of the non-handicapped poor.  
Economic discrimination . . . is not cognizable as a failure to make 
reasonable accommodations . . . .”216  The majority contrasted what it 
considered an accommodation appropriately linked to a disability: when a 
seeing-eye dog is permitted despite a “no pets” policy, wrote the majority, 
that accommodation responds directly to a disability.217
Salute was decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. Airways 
v. Barnett, a case arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
 
218  
That case held that a person with a disability similarly situated to a person 
without a disability may have preference (an accommodation) if the 
accommodation responds to the need created by the disability, even if the 
policy in question poses barriers to the non-disabled person as well.  As the 
Supreme Court pointed out: “Were that not so, the ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ provision could not accomplish its intended objective . . . 
[m]any employers will have neutral rules governing the kinds of actions 
most needed to reasonably accommodate a worker with a disability.”219  
The case also rejected Justice Scalia’s reasoning that a policy that burdens 
the disabled and non-disabled alike is therefore not a disability-related 
obstacle.220
In view of Barnett, it seems unlikely that Salute could survive as a 
matter of Fair Housing Act jurisprudence.  Indeed, a post-Barnett case, 
Giebeler v. M&B Associates,
 
221
 
 215. Id. at 302. 
 dealt with the case of a man who did not 
have earned income because his disability rendered him unable to work.  
The man sought to have his mother, a financially responsible person, be a 
co-signer on the lease, and wanted to have the landlord’s “no co-signer” 
policy waived.  Permitting the co-signing would have caused the landlord 
no financial harm; on the contrary, the proposed co-signer met the 
landlord’s financial qualifications.  Nevertheless, the landlord refused.  The 
Ninth Circuit found that the waiver of the policy represented, first of all, a 
type of accommodation contemplated by the Fair Housing Act, and, as 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 301-02. 
 218. U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). Though Barnett was an Americans 
with Disabilities Act case, courts interpreting the disability rights provisions of the Fair 
Housing Act frequently analogize to the ADA.  See, e.g., Tsombinidis v. West Haven Fire 
Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 219. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 398. 
 220. See id. at 413. 
 221. 343 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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applied to the facts of the case, was a reasonable accommodation.222
Giebeler adopted the reasoning of the dissent in Salute, which had 
pointed out that, in the seeing-eye dog and other examples cited by the 
Second Circuit majority: 
 
[I]t is not the handicap itself that is directly accommodated by the change 
in a policy. Rather, it is the need that was created by the particular 
handicap that is accommodated. Thus, a person’s blindness creates the 
need for a seeing-eye dog, and a person’s multiple sclerosis leads to 
impaired mobility, which, in turn, creates the need for a priority parking 
space close to the tenant’s residence.223
Having identified the request for a waiver of the “no-cosigner” policy as 
an “accommodation,” the Ninth Circuit found that: (1) the plaintiff had 
demonstrated that the proposed accommodation was reasonable on its face; 
and that (2) the defendant had failed to meet its burden of showing that, in 
the particular circumstances, agreeing to the request would have caused it 
undue hardship.
 
224
Whatever the ultimate result under the Fair Housing Act, the type of 
accommodation sought in the Giebeler case would certainly be covered 
under the City Human Rights Law.  In contrast to the ADA, the threshold 
coverage provisions of which the Supreme Court has felt the need to 
interpret “strictly” to make certain that no more people are covered than 
Congress intended,
 
225
For example, one has a “disability” for purposes of City Human Rights 
Law regardless of whether one’s impairment substantially limits one in a 
major life activity or not.
 the City Human Rights Law has no such concerns.  
Not only does the Restoration Act’s overall focus on the broadest possible 
coverage preclude judicial carving out of a category of accommodation, the 
disability provisions themselves offer specific additional evidence of the 
desire to go even further than the Fair Housing Act or the ADA. 
226  Housing providers have qualitatively more 
extensive obligations regarding modifications to premises than are required 
under the Fair Housing Act.227
 
 222. Id. at 1145. 
  The obligation to make accommodation 
arises not only where a covered entity actually knows of a disability, but 
 223. Salute, 136 F.3d at 308 (Calebresi, J., dissenting), cited with approval in Giebeler, 
343 F.3d at 1153. 
 224. Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1140-42. 
 225. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002) (stating its 
conclusion that the terms “need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for 
qualifying as disabled is confirmed by the first section of the ADA, which lays out the 
legislative findings and purposes that motivate the Act”). 
 226. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(16)(a). 
 227. See discussion infra notes 252-256 and accompanying text. 
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also where the covered entity should know of a disability.228
Most importantly, the accommodation language itself is framed 
extremely broadly.  The requirement is to make reasonable accommodation 
to the “needs” of persons with disabilities (not to “disabilities” directly).
 
229
A plaintiff does have to identify an accommodation that would enable 
him to overcome a disability-generated need “to enjoy the right or rights in 
question,”
  
The law also sets out a different analysis than pertains under federal law. 
230  but “reasonable accommodation” is defined as “such 
accommodation that can be made that shall not cause undue hardship in the 
conduct of the covered entity’s business.”231  Every accommodation, 
therefore, that “can be made” is reasonable except for those a covered 
entity proves would pose an “undue hardship.”232  The category of 
accommodations under federal law that are “unreasonable” though they do 
not cause “undue hardship,”233 simply does not exist under the City Law.  
Finally, the City Law places the burden of persuasion on a covered entity 
on the question of whether the person with a disability could, with the 
proposed accommodation, enjoy the rights in question.234
Because a waiver of a “no co-signer” or “no guarantor” rule of the sort at 
issue in Giebeler could enable a person unable to work because of a 
disability to rent or buy an apartment, such an accommodation is required 
by the City Human Rights Law unless the covered entity could prove that, 
in the particular circumstance, the waiver would cause an undue hardship. 
 
The issues raised by the conflicting cases of Salute and Giebeler were 
much on the minds of those seeking the independent construction sought to 
be guaranteed by the Restoration Act.235
 
 228. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(15)(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 
  Similar issues, also appropriately 
3, at 163. 
 229. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(15)(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 163. 
 230. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(15)(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 163. 
 231. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(18); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 149. 
 232. The burden of persuasion of demonstrating undue hardship is placed on the 
defendant.  N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(18); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 149. 
 233. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401-21. 
 234. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(15)(b). 
 235. See, e.g., Edith Prentiss, Representative of Disabled In Action, Statement at Hearing 
of the New York City Council Committee on General Welfare (Sept. 22, 2004) (on file with 
the Committee): 
Another problem is landlords who reject applicants able to pay rent from sources 
other than a paycheck.  Many landlords have a policy against permitting a parent 
or other relative to co-sign, or be a guarantor on a lease.  Reasonable 
accommodation under existing law should mean that a landlord has to change that 
policy in the case of a person with a disability.  To do so causes no harm to the 
landlord: he is assured of the rent.  Nevertheless, landlords refuse to do so, 
causing even more apartments to be off-limits to people with disabilities. . . . If a 
person with a disability brought this kind of case in federal court in California, 
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requiring accommodation under the local law, were brought up as well: 
When someone is able to afford the rent with disability, pension, or other 
unearned income, they should be allowed to do so, even if the landlord 
usually requires earned income.  When considering whether someone 
does have enough money to afford an apartment, it is important for 
landlords to accommodate people with disabilities by converting after-tax 
income to its larger pre-tax equivalent.  The strengthening of the liberal 
construction provision of the law will help us in these respects as well.236
The example of “converting after-tax income to its larger pre-tax 
equivalent” represents another circumstance where people with disabilities 
can be helped, without housing providers being hurt.  When a housing 
provider develops an income requirement, that housing provider is 
contemplating that the income to be measured will involve pre-tax dollars.  
The housing provider requires an income of “x” because the housing 
provider understands that, after taxes, the prospective tenant will only have 
seventy percent or eighty percent of “x” left over (depending on tax 
bracket).  A person with disabilities who is applying based on post-tax 
funds does not need the higher gross amount in order to yield the seventy 
percent or eighty percent “left over” that the housing provider is actually 
looking for.  Converting the post-tax funds of a person with disabilities to 
their pre-tax equivalent is an accommodation that simply allows apples to 
be compared with apples. 
 
iii. No undervaluation of compensatory damages 
Damage awards in the discrimination context have frequently been the 
subject of reduction, by both trial and appellate courts.237
 
they would win.  But in New York, they would lose because the court dismisses 
this problem as being only ‘economic discrimination.’  The City Human Rights 
Law offers a means independent of federal law by which to vindicate the rights of 
qualified applicants.  But it will only work if the law is amended, as is proposed 
by Intro 22, to require courts to interpret the local law independent of federal law, 
with a view towards liberally interpreting the statute to accomplish its broad 
objectives. 
  It is the rare case 
Id. 
 236. Alexander Wood, Executive Director, Disabilities Network of New York City, 
Statement at Hearing of New York City Council Committee on General Welfare (Sept. 22, 
2004) (on file with Committee). 
 237. New York courts have not hesitated to use their authority to determine that an award 
is not “reasonably related to the wrongdoing” or not “comparable to other awards for similar 
injuries.” See, e.g., Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth. v. New York 
State Executive Dep’t, 632 N.Y.S.2d 642, 644 (App. Div. 1995) (purporting to apply these 
standards to reduce a $30,000 mental anguish award to $7,500 in an age discrimination case 
conducted before the State Division on Human Rights).  Likewise, federal courts have not 
hesitated to apply the “shocks the judicial conscience test.” See Rainone v. Potter, 388 F. 
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in which the fact that the injury is a discrimination injury is affirmatively 
treated as placing the harm suffered in the category of “serious injury.” 
Broome v. Biondi,238
Shannon Broome stated that she felt embarrassed and humiliated by the 
entire approval process and the ultimate denial of their sublet application. 
She testified that she felt as if she were experiencing her “worst 
nightmare.” Shannon Broome was reduced to tears during the June 13th 
Beekman board interview, and again upon hearing the news that their 
sublet application had been rejected. She also testified that she was 
reluctant to tell her husband that the Beekman board rejected their 
application because she “knew how much it was going to upset him.” 
 a case involving the discriminatory denial of an 
application to sublet a co-op apartment, was one such case.  There had been 
limited testimony as to emotional distress.  The court’s description is 
reproduced here in full: 
Gregory Broome testified that he felt “angry” and “demoralized” by the 
hostile manner in which he and his wife were treated at the June 13th 
interview and that “it was difficult for [his] feelings to go away.” He 
described how he was especially humiliated that he had swallowed his 
pride and submitted to the board’s interrogation during the June 13th 
interview without defending himself or his wife. Gregory Broome also 
stated that his confidence at work was affected by his “fear that clients 
would somehow not trust [his] advice after they met [him].” Each of the 
Broomes testified that they had to pass the Beekman Hill House every day 
to reach a park to walk their dog and were reminded constantly of their 
emotional pain caused by the board’s actions.239
The jury awarded each plaintiff approximately $114,000 in emotional 
distress damages and $205,000 each in punitive damages.  Despite the 
limited testimony, and despite the absence of medical testimony, the court 
 
 
Supp. 2d 120, 122-23 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (reviewing the range within which awards have been 
constricted and noting: 
In the employment discrimination context, there appears to be a ‘spectrum’ or 
‘continuum’ of damage awards for emotional distress. . . .  At the low end of the 
continuum are what have become known as ‘garden-variety’ distress claims in 
which district courts have awarded damages for emotional distress ranging from 
$5,000 to $35,000. . . .  The middle of the spectrum consists of ‘significant’ 
($50,000 up to $100,000) and ‘substantial’ emotional distress claims 
($100,000). . . .  Finally, on the high end of the spectrum are ‘egregious’ 
emotional distress claims, where the courts have upheld or remitted awards for 
distress to a sum in excess of $100,000. These awards have only been warranted 
where the discriminatory conduct was outrageous and shocking or where the 
physical health of plaintiff was significantly affected. 
 238. 17 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 239. Id. at 223 (transcript references omitted). 
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denied a motion to reduce the awards.240  Citing what the court described 
as “illuminating” research on the serious,241
In the face of persistent housing discrimination which continues unabated 
some 30 years after Congress passed the Fair Housing Act to stamp out 
decades of such discriminatory behavior, the genuine emotional pain 
associated with such discrimination should not be devalued by 
unreasonably low compensatory damage awards, especially when one 
considers the difficulty a plaintiff faces in establishing that he or she was 
a victim of housing discrimination.
 ongoing costs of 
discrimination, the court concluded that: 
242
The Restoration Act echoes Broome’s message that the genuine pain 
associated with discrimination claims should not be undervalued.  The City 
Human Rights Law’s purposes are said to be not only uniquely broad, they 
are “uniquely broad and remedial.”
 
243  One of the core principles intended 
by the Council to guide decision makers is that “victims of discrimination 
suffer serious injuries, for which they ought to receive full 
compensation.”244
There are two possibilities to explain the frequency with which verdicts 
are reduced: one is that judges need to be vigilant to guard against the 
possibility of juries rendering awards without an adequate evidentiary basis 
that injury has been suffered; the other is that juries recognize, in a way that 
most judges are unwilling to, that exposure to discrimination is itself—
without more—a serious dignitary injury.  Put another way, the vigilance-
against-excessiveness school does not assign any baseline value to the 
insult to dignity itself; the (much smaller) vigilance-against-unreasonably-
low-awards school does so.  The Restoration Act stands with the latter 
camp, and thus counsels judges to defer more to a jury’s consideration of 
the nature of the discrimination injury. 
 
3. Resisting the urge to import exemptions not set forth in the local law 
i. Disparate impact claims in the age discrimination context 
The Supreme Court concluded in Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi245
 
 240. Id. at 223-24 (citing, inter alia, to cases that had upheld mental anguish awards of 
$150,000, $250,000, $450,000, and $500,000).  Both plaintiffs’ lawyers and discrimination 
defense lawyers would agree that these sustained awards represent the exception to the rule. 
 
 241. Id. at 225 n.9. 
 242. Id. at 226 (citations omitted). 
 243. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 7 amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-130. 
 244. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5. 
 245. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005). 
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that “the scope of disparate-impact liability under the [ADEA] is narrower 
than under Title VII.”246  One reason for this is that the ADEA, unlike Title 
VII, has a provision insulating from disparate-impact liability employer 
decisions based on a reasonable factor other than age.247 The other reason 
cited by the Court is the way that Congress legislatively overruled Ward’s 
Cove, a case which had, inter alia, introduced requirements that made it 
significantly more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in disparate impact 
cases.248 When Congress rejected major aspects of the Court’s disparate 
impact holding, it did so by amending Title VII, the statute that the 
Supreme Court had been interpreting in Ward’s Cove.  The Supreme Court 
in Smith seized on the fact that Congress had not amended the ADEA as 
evidence that Congress had  implicitly endorsed the continued use of the 
disparate impact standards of Ward’s Cove in the age discrimination 
context.249
The City Human Rights Law, on the other hand, has no “reasonable 
factor of other than age” provision that limits its age discrimination 
coverage.
 
250  Moreover, it has an independent, distinct, post-Ward’s Cove 
provision governing disparate impact claims and the burdens of proof 
relating thereto.  That provision covers all types of discrimination, 
including age, without qualification.251
ii. Housing providers must make and pay for accommodations 
  Restrictions on disparate impact 
claims applicable to the ADEA cannot, therefore, be said to be applicable 
to the City Human Rights Law. 
Under the Fair Housing Act, as amended in 1988, housing providers 
only need to permit a person with a disability to make reasonable 
modifications to existing premises.252 The modifications are to be made at 
the expense of the person with a disability.253
 
 246. Id. at 1545 (plurality opinion). 
  When the City Human 
Rights Law was amended in 1991, it used quite different language.  In 
language directed at all covered entities (housing providers, employers, 
 247. Id. 
 248. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653–60 (1989). 
 249. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45. While Congress would have been aware that courts 
frequently analogize between and among different discrimination laws, the normal judicial 
practice is to import good law, not rejected doctrine.  As such, the idea that Congress would 
have thought that it was necessary to act separately to amend the ADEA is curious, to say 
the least; it certainly does not reflect liberal construction principles. 
 250. See  N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(1). 
 251. Id. § 8-107(17). 
 252. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(a) (2005). 
 253. Id. 
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etc.), it required covered entities to “make” reasonable accommodations.254  
It did not include a provision requiring the person with a disability to pay 
for the modifications.  On the contrary, its distinctive accommodation 
provision treats all accommodations that assist a person with a disability to 
enjoy the housing or other right in question as reasonable, unless and until 
the covered entity demonstrates that the accommodation would pose an 
undue hardship.255
Where a covered entity is able to demonstrate that making and paying 
for an modification would cause it undue hardship, that covered entity is 
not required to pay for the modification.  Restricting the law by judicial 
construction to allow covered entities to shirk their obligation to pay for 
accommodation where to do so would not cause an undue hardship would 
be contrary to the choices made by the City Council.
 
256
iii. Damages are available for both impact and mixed motive violations 
 
Under Title VII, damages are not permitted to be awarded against 
defendants who have been found to have engaged in disparate impact 
violations.257
 
 254. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(15)(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 
  Likewise, where a plaintiff has demonstrated an intentional 
discriminatory practice that was unlawfully motivated, and the defendant 
has demonstrated that it would have taken the same action in the absence of 
3, 162-63.  The 
City law uses the term “accommodation” to refer both to “accommodations” and 
“modifications.”  See United Veterans Mutual Housing No. 2 Corp. v. N.Y. City Comm’n 
on Human Rights, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 2, 1992, at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 616 N.Y.S.2d 84 
(App. Div. 1994) (affirming an order of the Human Rights Commission to a housing 
provider to establish a policy by which it would make and pay for all accommodations, 
including common area modifications such as the installation and maintenance of ramps, 
except where doing so would cause undue hardship and noting that the 1991 Amendments 
mooted the challenge to the Commission’s interpretation by explicitly adopting the 
Commission’s interpretation).  The use of the single term “accommodation” is a reflection 
of the fact that different contexts of discrimination (housing, employment, and public 
accommodations) are covered by the one provision. Note that even under federal law, 
physical modifications to the workplace are contemplated by the reasonable accommodation 
provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(a) (2005). 
 255. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(18) (“The term ‘reasonable accommodation’ 
means such accommodation that can be made that shall not cause undue hardship in the 
conduct of the covered entity’s business.  The covered entity shall have the burden of 
proving undue hardship”.). 
 256. It should be noted that, in 2003, the Bloomberg Administration attempted to cut 
back the scope of the law so that housing providers would only be responsible for paying for 
modifications to common areas, not individual units. Its proposed amendment to the City’s 
Human Rights Law was denominated “Intro 417 of 2003.”  That bill was abandoned in the 
face of opposition from the civil rights community. 
 257. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2005). 
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the impermissible mitigating factor, no damages may be awarded.258
The City Human Rights Law, by contrast, contains neither restriction.  
As to disparate impact, the 1991 Amendments treated disparate impact 
violations merely as one type of violation to be codified in the “unlawful 
discriminatory practices” section of the law.
 
259  At the same time, it re-
codified the section of the law dealing with the relief that could be ordered 
by the Commission after a hearing which found that “any unlawful 
discriminatory practice has occurred.”260  While making some changes—
like specifying the ability of the Commission to order a coop to approve a 
coop sale—it left intact the provision that permits the award of 
“compensatory damages to the person aggrieved by such practice.”261
Similarly, a judicial cause of action was defined by the 1991 
Amendments to be one “for damages, including punitive damages, and for 
injunctive relief and such other remedies as may be appropriate . . . .”
  The 
phrase “such practice” refers unmistakably to “any unlawful discriminatory 
practice,” without limitation. 
262  
The cause of action was available to anyone claimed to be aggrieved “by an 
unlawful discriminatory practice defined in chapter one of this title.”263
Just as the 1991 Amendments did not exclude damages in the disparate 
impact context, the Amendments did not exclude them in the context of a 
covered entity which proved that it would have taken the same action 
complained of, even in the absence of an impermissible motive.  Naturally, 
a defendant’s demonstration that it would have taken the same action 
against a plaintiff even in the absence of an impermissible motive will 
operate to limit or exclude some types of damages (e.g., backpay) in most 
circumstances.  Rather than being seen as a bar to all damages, however, 
that demonstration is properly seen under the City Human Rights Law as a 
factor to be considered in parsing and mitigating the damages to be 
awarded. 
  
Disparate impact violations are one such practice so defined.  Again, no 
exclusion was placed on the availability of damages. 
The Commission on Human Rights did so in one of the few mixed 
 
 258. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (2005). 
 259. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (“Unlawful Discriminatory Practices”); Id.§ 8-107(17) 
(defining when an “unlawful discriminatory practice based on disparate impact” is 
established). 
 260. Section 8-120(a) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York was replaced 
with section 8-109(2)(c).  See 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 166 and 172. 
 261. Id.  The compensatory damages provision is found at section 8-120(a)(7) of the 
Administrative Code of New York. 
 262. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 177. 
 263. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 177. 
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motive cases it decided.264  The Commission held that the legitimate 
motives could be taken into account when fashioning the remedy, but, 
explicitly contrasting its view of the City Law with that of Title VII, ruled 
that a flat prohibition of damages was inappropriate. Taking the view that 
“[a]n employee’s egregious conduct. . . does not justify an employer’s 
unlawful discrimination,” the Commission awarded mental anguish 
damages to a complainant who had been on the receiving end of an 
explicitly bigoted epithet closely linked to his discharge. 265  Refusing to 
exclude damages is a conclusion consistent with the Restoration Act’s 
concern that every discrimination injury be treated as a serious injury.266
In terms of punitive damages (and civil penalties to be awarded 
administratively), the City Human Rights Law has had since 1991 an 
explicit mechanism by which such damages or penalties may be 
mitigated.
 
267
4. No further rollback 
  Mitigation is not elimination, however.  A defendant’s 
persistence in a policy that it knows or should know has a distinctly 
disparate impact, where it has not bothered to examine less discriminatory 
alternatives that are available, may well be one circumstance where some 
punitives damages or civil penalties should be awarded.  Likewise, in a 
mixed motive context, the intentionally discriminatory features of a 
candidate selection process are not retroactively insulated from 
blameworthiness by the fact that the ultimate result was not altered by the 
impermissible considerations. 
i. Continuing to cover acts of post-acquisition harassment 
The doctrine that the Fair Housing Act does not or may not cover acts of 
 
 264. In terms of liability, the Commission’s Administrative Law Judge ruled that once a 
complainant demonstrated that “discriminatory animus played a motivating role in the 
decision-making process,” the liability of the respondent was established. Cassas v. Lenox 
Hill Hospital, No. EM-0191B-10/30/89-DES, 1997 WL 1052039, at *4 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. 
Rts., Feb. 6, 1997) (recommended decision and order). The ALJ further ruled that “[a] 
complainant does not bear the burden of proving that discrimination was the sole reason, 
true reason or principal reason an adverse employment action was taken.”  Id. The 
recommended decision and order was adopted by the Commission.  Cassas v. Lenox Hill 
Hosp., No. EM-01918-10/30/89-DES, 1997 WL 1051928 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., Mar. 
26, 1997) (decision and order). 
 265. Cassas, 1997 WL 1052039, at *8 (recommended decision and order), adopted, 
Cassas v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 1997 WL 1051928 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., Mar. 26, 1997) 
(decision and order).  
 266. See 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5-6; see also N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 
8-101 (setting forth the intention that discrimination be prevented “from playing any role”). 
 267. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(13)(e), 8-126(b). 
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post-acquisition conduct was invented by Judge Posner in 2004.268  The 
ruling was made in the face of HUD Regulations in effect since 1989 (that 
is, at the time of the adoption both of the 1991 Amendments and of the 
Restoration Act), which included on its list of “terms and conditions” those 
violations which occur after a property has been acquired by sale or 
lease.269  Specifically, the regulations have prohibited failing or delaying 
maintaining or repairing a dwelling,270 and limiting the “use of privileges, 
services or facilities associated with a dwelling.”271
Halprin and its progeny were specifically cited in testimony to the 
Council as an illustration of potential weakening of federal law against 
which the Restoration Act would protect the local law.
 
272  The idea that a 
covered entity would be permitted to harass an existing tenant because of 
protected class is utterly repugnant to the City Human Rights Law’s broad 
and inclusive proscriptions on discrimination, and could not properly be 
imported.273
ii. Preserving broad organizational standing 
 
In 1982, the Supreme Court ruled in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman274 
that the Fair Housing Act had “conferred on all ‘persons’ a legal right to 
truthful information about available housing,” without regard to race.275  
This principle was used in Havens to grant standing to “testers” (persons 
who act in an investigatory capacity for a fair housing organization, but 
who have no actual intention to secure the property being viewed)276  but is 
not limited to testers alone.  The definition of “person” in the Fair Housing 
Act, like the City Human Rights Law, is broad, and encompasses a 
corporation,277
 
 268. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 the usual form of not-for-profit fair housing organization. 
 269. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65 (2005). 
 270. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(2) (2005). 
 271. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4) (2005). 
 272. See Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 3; Brennan Statement, supra note 23, at 7 
(“The independent construction provision would provide a buffer against the application of 
the doctrines to the City’s Human Rights Law, and would help advocates argue against any 
other ratcheting down of the local law based on narrowed understandings of state and 
federal civil rights law.”). 
 273. For an extended discussion of why Halprin is “problematic,” “anomalous,” and 
“clearly wrong,” even in terms of federal law, see ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING 
DISCRIMINATION, LAW AND LITIGATION 14 §§ 9-22  (2005). 
 274. 455 U.S. 363 (1982). 
 275. Id. at 373 (emphasis supplied; internal quotation in original). 
 276. Id. 
 277. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d) (2005); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(1).  The 1991 
Amendments broadened the City Law’s definition of “person” in a number of ways, 
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A corporation, of course, can only act through its agents.278  As such, a 
fair housing not-for-profit seeks information through its agents (testers), 
and is itself deprived of truthful information about available housing in 
violation of the Havens rule if its agents are so deprived because of 
protected class status.279
This result is the only one consistent with Congress’ intent.  Rather than 
relying  on government prosecutions alone, “Congress created this right so 
that private persons could enforce the statute as private attorneys general 
without running afoul of Article III.”
 
280  Private fair housing organizations 
are the “persons” best suited to play the contemplated private attorneys 
general role. Indeed, in 1992, as part of the Housing and Community 
Development Act, Congress found, inter alia, that “their proven efficacy of 
private nonprofit fair housing enforcement organizations and community-
based efforts makes support for these organizations a necessary component 
of the fair housing enforcement system.”281
Unlike the tester—who is but an agent of the testing organization, who 
acquires information only for the testing organization, and who may have 
only a transitory participation in fair housing work—a testing organization 
is the tester’s principal, has ongoing participation in fair housing work and 
is the ultimate recipient of the information (or misinformation) about 
housing availability.  The testing organization, therefore, has an even 
stronger claim to standing than does the tester. 
 
It would surprise no one if the Supreme Court someday soon were to cut 
back on standing that stemmed from a broad decision of a very different 
1972 Supreme Court.  But the City Human Rights Law should not be cut 
back in tandem.  Even before the 1991 Amendments, the City Human 
Rights Law had been interpreted by the Commission on Human Rights to 
have intended the broadest possible standing.  Citing Trafficante and 
Havens, the Commission concluded that, just as the Supreme Court had 
ruled that Congress had intended “to define standing as broadly as is 
 
including the addition of “organizations” within its ambit.  See 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 
4, at 145. 
 278. William Meade Fletcher, 2 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 434 (2005) (“That a corporation can act only through agents is too 
elementary a proposition to require the citation of authority.”). 
 279. In Havens itself, the fair housing organization based its own claim for standing, and 
it was granted on the grounds that the defendant’s conduct has forced it into a “diversion of 
resources” and had caused “frustration of mission.”  Havens, 455 U.S. at 378-380.  The fact 
that fair housing organizations have thereafter fit their cases into a “diversion of resources” 
or “frustration of mission” box does not alter the availability of standing under Havens for 
all ‘persons’ discriminatorily denied truthful information. 
 280. Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 281. Housing and Community Development Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1615 (1992). 
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permitted by Article III of the Constitution,”282 the City Human Rights 
Law echoes this construction by the inclusion of [language] which provides 
that this title ‘shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the 
purposes thereof’.”283
Because the kind of analysis engaged in by Trafficante and Havens 
broadly considered an all-encompassing anti-discrimination goal, that 
analysis can usefully be seen “as a floor below which the City Human 
Rights Law cannot fall.”
 
284  Moreover, the issue of maintaining broad 
standing was specifically put before the Council in testimony and 
statements as one of the goals and consequences of passing the Restoration 
Act.285
5. Overcoming the inhibition effect 
  Regardless of what the Supreme Court comes to do, both testers 
and fair housing organizations should be found to have standing under the 
City Human Rights Law for the discriminatory deprivation of truthful 
information regarding available housing. 
Civil rights advocates have been on the defensive for so long that it is 
sometimes hard to imagine that fruitful new legal territory is available to be 
utilized.  The Restoration Act is both a response to advocates who sought 
new momentum in the fight against discrimination, and a call to others to 
take up this fight with renewed vigor.  The illustrations discussed below 
each arise from statutory language, or were referenced in testimony in the 
course of consideration of the Restoration Act. 
 
 282. Folan v. Festinger, No. 92681-H, 1983 WL 207649, at *7 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., 
Dec. 22, 1983) (decision and order) (quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 
U.S. 205, 209 (1972)). 
 283. Id.  A decision contemporaneous with the adoption of the 1991 Amendments stated 
that it is “well settled that the use of testers is an investigative tool looked upon with favor 
by federal and state courts, and by this Commission.”  Childs v. Milman, No. FH 
167052489, 1991 WL 790571, at *12 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., Oct. 25, 1991) 
(recommended decision and order), adopted by No. FH 167052489DH, 1992 WL 814977 
(N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., Apr. 8, 1992) (decision and order ). 
 284. See Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 1. 
 285. See Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 4 (“We will be able to protect against the 
time when federal courts cut back on standing for testers and for fair housing 
organizations.”); see also Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 7 (“Rather than being 
reactive—waiting, for example, until after the Supreme Court cuts back on standing for 
testers and fair housing organizations, and then waiting further, for the years it frequently 
takes to achieve a specific legislative restoration—Intro 22 will provide a means of 
preventing such dismantling of New York City’s civil rights protections from occurring in 
the first place.”). 
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i. Discrimination in the delivery of City services 
The assertion is frequently made that there are gross disparities in the 
delivery of City services (and in the burden of City infrastructure) 
depending on the neighborhood in which one lives.286  Because New York 
City is so highly segregated,287 such neighborhood variations would yield 
strong racial disparities.288
Because the City Human Rights Law defines public accommodations to 
include a provider of any and all services,
 
289 and because the City is not 
excluded from that definition,290
 
 286. See NYC Environmental Justice Alliance, 
 the delivery of City services is open to a 
challenge pursuant to the distinctive disparate impact provisions of the 
http://www.nyceja.org/campaigns.html 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2006) (“New York  City has one of the lowest standards of open space 
access (acres per 1000 residents) in the United States. . . . 37 of 59 community districts 
(63%), more than previously thought, are not meeting the standard of 2.5 acres per 1000 
residents with regard to access to open space.  Of these 37 districts, 24 have the highest 
number of residents of color (65% or more) and 18 are of the lowest median household 
income ($16,000-$30,000).  These communities are also the one’s [sic] carrying the rest of 
the City’s environmental burdens from waste transfer stations to power plants.”). 
 287. See, e.g., JOHN ICELAND ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1980-2000, at 85-87 
(2002) (finding that the New York primary metropolitan statistical area, which encompasses 
New York City, as well as Westchester, Putnam, and Rockland Counties, was the single 
most segregated major metropolitan area in the United States for Hispanics and Latinos); 
see also Current-Day Segregation in New York City, Analysis of Census 2000 Data and 
Maps by Professor Andrew A. Beveridge for the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New 
York, available at www.antibiaslaw.com/nycseg.pdf. 
 288. The existence of educational segregation, for example, is a direct function of 
residential segregation. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE 
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 329 (1996) (“The school segregation 
that exists in any given community today shows the enduring effects of practices and 
expectations rooted in past discrimination in housing.”).  The disparities in the education 
system have been the subject of constant criticism, including even criticism from those 
running the system.  See, e.g., Chancellor Joel Klein, New York City Dep’t of Ed., Remarks 
at a “Teach for America” Dinner (May 19, 2004) (“It is clear to me that the purpose that 
animated and compelled [Brown v. Board of Education] is not being fulfilled here in New 
York City—or across our nation.  We have not remedied the broad disparities in either 
educational opportunities or student achievement that were the driving force behind Brown.  
These disparities deprive our children of equality.  They restrict children’s life choices.  
That is wrong.  And it is a stark reminder that the fight for civil rights in this country is not 
over.”). 
 289. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9). 
 290. On the contrary, the Committee Report accompanying the 1991 Amendments 
pointed out the City schools would be covered by the public accommodations provision.  
See 1991 COMMITTEE REPORT ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 4 (“The amendment would also 
eliminate the current exclusion of public libraries, schools, colleges, and other educational 
institutions. . . .  Although a variety of other laws . . . cover certain aspects of 
discrimination . . . the City has an independent and overriding interest in routing out 
discrimination from its schools.”). 
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law.291
ii. Limiting the circumstances where punitive damages can be evaded 
 
Under the Kolstad standard, good faith compliance measures that are 
taken by a covered entity act as a safe harbor against punitive damages 
under federal law.292  In contrast, the currently operative provision of the 
City Human Rights Law, explicitly provides that such good faith measures 
only mitigate liability for punitive damages.293  Courts have assumed that 
other aspects of Kolstad—like the requisite mental state required for the 
imposition of punitive damages, and who has to have that mental state—are 
areas where the City Human Rights Law tracks the federal standard.294
In terms of the required mental state, Kolstad requires that a defendant 
have acted in reckless disregard of a perceived risk that its actions will 
violate civil rights law.
  In 
fact, no court has engaged in an independent assessment of whether these 
aspects of Kolstad actually serve the purposes of the City Human Rights 
Law. 
295 Given the City Human Rights Law’s overriding 
concern that covered entities be made to recognize the seriousness with 
which they must take their obligations, advocates will likely question why 
a defendant who recklessly disregards the risk that its conduct will harm 
the plaintiff should not, as a matter of local law, be liable for punitive 
damages.296  Such conduct is blameworthy regardless of whether the 
defendant is disregarding, as required by Kolstad, a known risk of violating 
the law.297
In terms of who must possess the requisite culpable mental state, Kolstad 
limits the class for federal law purposes to managerial employees.
 
298
 
 291. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(17). 
  
 292. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (1999). 
 293. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(13)(e). 
 294. E.g., Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2001) (federal 
law is not adopted where City law (as in the case of mitigation of punitives) has explicitly 
adopted a standard different from the federal standard, but federal law is adopted where City 
law is silent). 
 295. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536. 
 296. Where a defendant intends that its conduct harm the plaintiff, of course, the question 
of reckless disregard does not come into play, and punitive damages are properly founded 
on a theory of malice.  Kolstad did nothing to upset that aspect of the law.  Id. (describing 
recklessness as an alternative to a showing of malice or “evil motive or intent”). 
 297. This issue was brought to the Council’s attention through the testimony of the Anti-
Discrimination Center.  See Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 4. 
 298. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 542-43 (noting that a managerial employee must be an 
“important” employee); id. at 546.  Of course, when the employer itself participates in 
harassment, where the discriminatory acts are quintessentially employer acts, or where the 
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Restricting the universe of those for whom an employer may be held liable 
in punitive damages to managerial employees, however, is a restriction 
contrary to the choice made by the City Human Rights Law.  The vicarious 
liability provisions do not by their terms exclude any type of damages from 
the application of the principle of vicarious responsibility.299  Moreover, 
the employer in the housing or public accommodations context become 
automatically liable based on the conduct of the employee or agent, without 
limitation.300  The employer in the workplace context becomes 
automatically liable based on the conduct of the employee or agent who 
exercises supervisory or managerial authority, without limitation.301  These 
provisions reflect an overriding concern of the City Human Rights Law that 
employers are obliged to take all reasonable steps to prevent their 
employees and agents from discriminating.  The potential of having 
punitive damages imposed based solely on the mental state of the employee 
gives the employer added incentive not only to disseminate anti-
discrimination policies, but to make sure they are effectively policed.302
PART II: THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE RESTORATION ACT 
 
Though the need for broad and independent interpretation of the City 
Human Rights Law was of paramount importance in drafting the 
Restoration Act, there are specific changes rendered by the Act that are 
themselves of great importance. 
A. Retaliation 
The Second Circuit’s “materiality” standard for an action to be adverse 
is rejected.  The Restoration Act provides that retaliation: 
 
participant is sufficiently high in the employer’s organization to be considered an alter ego 
of the employer, the employer is more properly said to directly liable.  Faragher, 524 U.S. 
at 788-90.  Direct liability analysis can extend to the imposition of punitive damages.  Cf. 
Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Svcs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(company directly liable in punitives because of reckless indifference on the part of the 
employee it designated to respond to complaints of discrimination). 
 299. See  N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(13)(a),(b), and (c). 
 300. See id. § 8-107(13)(a). 
 301. See id. § 8-107(13)(b)(1). 
 302. The local law’s emphasis of maximizing effective policing of policies is reflected in 
the fact that the “good faith” factors for mitigation of punitive damages specify that the 
required policies must be policies for the prevention “and detection” of discrimination.  Id. § 
8-107(13)(d)(1).  One such policy that is specified is one that has “[p]rocedures for the 
supervision of employees and agents and for the oversight of persons employed as 
independent contractors specifically directed at the prevention and detection of 
[discriminatory] practices.”  Id. § 8-107(13)(d)(1)(iv) (emphasis added). 
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need not result in an ultimate action with respect to employment, housing 
or a public accommodation or in a materially adverse change in the terms 
and conditions of employment, housing, or a public accommodation, 
provided, however, that the retaliatory or discriminatory act or acts 
complained of must be reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging 
in protected activity.303
The Committee Report explicitly states that the amendment: 
 
would make clear that the standard to be applied to retaliation claims 
under the City’s differs from the standard currently applied by the Second 
Circuit in retaliation claims made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964; it is in line with the standard set out in guidelines of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and applied to retaliation 
claims by federal courts in several other circuits.304
 The EEOC Guidelines take the position that the “degree of harm 
suffered by the individual ‘goes to the issue of damages, not liability.’”
 
305
This broad view of coverage accords with the primary purpose of the anti-
retaliation provisions, which is to ‘[m]aintain[] unfettered access to 
statutory remedial mechanisms.’  Regardless of the degree or quality of 
harm to the particular complainant, retaliation harms the public interest by 
deterring others from filing a charge.  An interpretation of Title VII that 
permits some forms of retaliation to go unpunished would undermine the 
effectiveness of the EEOC statutes and conflict with the language and 
purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions.
  
The Guidelines explain the policy reasons for this view in terms 
remarkably similar to those that animated the Restoration Act: 
306
 As such, many manifestations of retaliation that would not 
necessarily meet a materiality standard, do meet the EEOC test.  The 
Committee Report that accompanied the Restoration Act noted that “lateral 
transfers, unfavorable job references, and change in work schedules” would 
be among the conduct that would be actionable under the test contemplated 
by the Restoration Act.
 
307
 When construing the enhanced retaliation provision, it is important  
to remember that the 1991 Amendments had already sought to broaden 
 
 
 303. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 3, amending  N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(7). 
 304. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 3.  
 305. 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8, 13 (1998) (internal citation omitted), available 
at eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.pdf. 
 306. Id. at 8-15 (internal citations omitted). 
 307. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 3 n.4, (citing a review of the state of the 
law in Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241-43 (9th Cir. 2000)).  Another case cited in 
Ray found that an employer’s “cancellation of a public event honoring an employee” could 
constitute actionable conduct.  Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242. 
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coverage by adding to the then-existing anti-retaliation section a phrase that 
attempted to make clear that it was illegal to retaliate “in any manner.”308  
Combined with the policy grounds for the EEOC’s position, cited with 
approval by the 2005 Committee Report, as well as with the Restoration 
Act’s own goal to ensure “that New York City does everything within its 
power to identify and root out discrimination,”309
 There may well be some types of conduct, which, if examined 
without regard to chilling effect, might not, at first blush, seem more than 
trivial.  But a useful question to be posed is this: “What would happen if 
the policy manual of the covered entity being sued had stated that 
opposition to discrimination would be responded to by the retaliatory 
conduct that the covered entity was proved to have engaged in?”
 it is clear that the 
Restoration Act’s “reasonably likely to deter” standard is intended to cover 
a very wide range of conduct. 
310
B. Domestic Partnership 
  If the 
response publicized were simply that the employee’s supervisor would be 
less effusively friendly for a few days, it is not likely that any employees 
would be deterred from opposing discrimination in the future.  But, if the 
“full advance disclosure of retaliation” manual explained that the cost of 
opposing discrimination would be the loss of all future social intercourse 
with other employees, the workplace reality would be that some people—
indeed, many people—would become less likely to oppose discrimination 
than they otherwise would be.  And the chilling effect would take place 
even in the absence of any fear of discharge, demotion, transfer, or poor 
references.  The need to make a real world evaluation of how a particular 
type of conduct (in particular circumstances) would be perceived is another 
case where the determination is best suited to a jury after trial, not to a 
judge on a summary judgment motion. 
 The Restoration Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
“partnership status” across all contexts of discrimination covered by the 
City Human Rights Law.  “Partnership status” means the status of being in 
a “domestic partnership,” as that term is already defined under New York 
City law.  An individual can be in a domestic partnership, and thus have 
 
 308. 1991 Amendments, supra note 3, §1, amending  N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(7) 
(1989); see 1991 LEG. ANN, supra note 4, at 160. 
 309. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 4. 
 310. It is worth noting here that it is only where a covered entity has intentionally taken 
some action against a plaintiff because of opposition to discrimination, and the plaintiff has 
proven that a causal link exists between the opposition and the action in response, that a 
defendant faces liability. 
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partnership status, as can a couple.  The 2005 Committee Report 
specifically states that “life partners” and others who are domestic partners 
under New York City law are to “receive protection from all forms of 
discrimination addressed by the human rights law, just as married partners 
do.”311
 Health insurance and other employer-provided benefits are clearly 
“terms, conditions or privileges of employment,” and, hence, the terms of 
the operative provision of the City Human Rights Law are applicable to a 
covered entity’s refusal to provide such insurance or benefits to domestic 
partners.  Claims will undoubtedly be made that the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) preempts the local law in this one respect.  It 
is beyond the scope of this article to attempt to resolve the preemption 
question,
 
312
 The 1991 Amendments provided that the employment 
discrimination provisions as they related to employee benefit plans “shall 
not be construed to preclude an employer from observing the requirements 
of [an ERISA plan] that is in compliance with applicable federal 
discrimination laws where the application of [the City Law provision] 
would be preempted by such act.”
 but the way that City Law itself handles the question is 
instructive. 
313
C. Catalyst Case Fees 
  On one level, this language may 
seem unnecessary: if there were federal preemption, that preemption would 
operate regardless of whether a state or local statute explicitly referenced it.  
On another level, however, the provision demonstrates that City Law made 
a conscious choice to go as far as permissible.  The only limit being 
imposed was any limit that existed by the operation of preemption, and no 
additional limitation should be inferred. 
 Buckhannon314
 
 311. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 
 is rejected for City Human Rights Law purposes.  As 
amended, section 8-502(f) of the New York City Human Rights Law 
specifies that a prevailing party who may be awarded costs and fees 
“includes a plaintiff whose commencement of litigation has acted as a 
22, at 2-3 (emphasis added). 
 312. Given that the City Human Rights Law does not seek to specify the substance of 
coverage to be provided, does not seek to regulate the administration of the benefits 
program, and does not cause a burden to plan administrators, one would imagine that the 
argument against section 1144 preemption to be strong.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2005). 
 313. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(e)(i) (emphasis added); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, 
at 152. 
 314. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health, 532 U.S. 598 
(2001). 
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catalyst to effect policy change on the part of the defendant, regardless of 
whether that change has been implemented voluntarily, as a result of a 
settlement or as a result of a judgment in such plaintiff’s favor.”315
D. Civil Penalties 
  The 
change is another example of the Council wanting to make certain that the 
law in no way discourages individuals and organizations from playing a 
vigorous private attorney general role. 
When civil penalties were introduced to the City Human Rights Law in 
1991, they were designed to vindicate the public interest, and were 
available up to $50,000 even where there had been no showing of 
willfulness or maliciousness, and up to $100,000 where there had been 
such a showing.316  A problem that emerged was that the caps were too low 
to achieve their purpose of vindicating the public interest.  In a case of 
harassment of a person with AIDS several years ago, the appellate court 
reduced the Commission-imposed civil penalty from $75,000 to $25,000, 
even though it believed that the defendant had acted abhorrently.317  
Nevertheless, because the landlord was not one of the City’s largest, the 
court cut the penalty.318
 The Restoration Act raises the caps to $125,000 without a showing 
of willfulness or maliciousness, and to $250,000 to such a showing.
  The pre-Restoration Act caps thus acted not only 
to prevent adequate punishment of larger wrongdoers; they also worked to 
ratchet down penalties for smaller wrongdoers below what is appropriate. 
319  The 
Council intended that these higher civil penalties reflect the fact that all 
acts of discrimination cause serious injury both to the individual victim and 
to the City,320 and that these higher penalties will demonstrate that 
discrimination “will not be tolerated.”321
 The fact that the caps were more than doubled should also be a 
 
 
 315. Restoration Act, supra note 8, § 8, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(f); see 
also 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at n.10 (citing the dissent of Justice Ginsburg 
in Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 627-28, and explaining that an analysis of the entitlement to 
costs and fees in a catalyst case can be based “on a three part analysis, which requires: (1) 
that the respondent provide at least some of the benefit sought by the lawsuit; (2) that the 
suit stated a genuine claim; and (3) that the suit was a substantial or significant cause of the 
act providing the relief”).  
 316. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-126(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 174. 
 317. Matter of 119-121 E. 97th St. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Comm’n on Human Rights, 642 
N.Y.S.2d 638, 644 (App. Div. 1996). 
 318. Id. 
 319. Restoration Act, supra note 8, § 6. 
 320. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 6. 
 321. Id. 
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factor in restraining judges who might otherwise be inclined to reduce 
punitive damage awards in cases brought in court.  A 250 percent increase 
in penalties available administratively strongly suggests that it is actually 
the award of “inadequate penalties” that is the key problem about which 
courts need to worry.  Likewise, the Council’s emphasis on the societal 
injury caused by discrimination should make judges skeptical that punitive 
awards are excessive.  Punitive damages can only meet the law’s goals of 
punishment, individual deterrence, and general deterrence if they are 
sufficient to “sting.” 
 There are what purport to be constitutional limitations on the size of 
punitive damage awards.322 One of the factors to be considered in “due 
process excessiveness” analysis is a comparison of the punitive damages 
awarded with the civil penalties available for similar conduct.  In BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore, the case that established the factors cited by 
State Farm, there was a $2,000,000 punitive damage award.323  That award 
represented an amount one thousand times the maximum civil penalty that 
could have been imposed by the state’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, a 
ratio that the Court found to be strongly indicative of excessiveness.324  
Under the City Human Rights Law as revised by the Restoration Act, by 
contrast, that $2,000,000 punitive damage award would only represent an 
amount eight times the amount that can now be imposed 
administratively.325
 
 322. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418, 425 (2003) 
(Interal citations omitted) (To determine whether a punitive damage award is excessive and 
violates the Due Process Clause, it is necessary to consider three factors, the most important 
of which is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; also to be 
considered is “the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff 
and the punitive damages award,” although a greater ratio may be necessary where the 
“monetary value of noneconomic harms might have been difficult to determine”; and, lastly, 
“the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties 
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”).  But see id. at 430-31 (Ginsburg, J. 
dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (“It was not until 1996 . . . that the Court, for the first 
time, invalidated a state-court punitive damages assessment as unreasonably large. . . . If our 
activity in this domain is now “well established” [as claimed by the majority], it takes place 
on ground not long held.”). 
  Both in terms of conveying the seriousness with which 
the City views discriminatory conduct, and by reducing the ratio between 
maximum civil penalties on the one hand and punitive damage awards 
measured in the millions of dollars on the other, the Restoration Act has 
made larger punitive damage awards more sustainable. 
 323. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 567 (1996). 
 324. Id. 
 325. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 6. 
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E. Thorough Investigations 
Citing a report on the City’s failure to enforce its Human Rights Law,326 
the Council imposed a requirement that the administrative investigations of 
the Commission on Human Rights be “thorough.”327  Among the many 
problems that the report had found was the fact that the Commission had 
been engaging “in a process of what might be called ‘asymmetrical 
skepticism.’” 328
on the idea that a complainant has not “rebutted” the contentions of the 
respondent—contentions generally contained in an answer or position 
statement prepared by respondent’s counsel. In essence, the Commission 
will say to an (almost always unrepresented) individual: “Go ahead and 
disprove what respondent’s counsel has written.”  The respondent’s 
attorney’s position winds up being treated as true unless conclusively 
proven false by complainant, without that position ever being challenged 
directly by Commission inquiry.
  “No probable cause determinations” repeatedly rely 
329
The Committee Report specified that, in general, the “thorough” 
investigation requirement “should include steps such as probing the reasons 
for a respondent’s conduct and actively seeking out facts from 
witnesses.”
 
330
F. Technical Changes 
  As such, the new requirement—in addition to causing the 
Commission to changes its practices—should mean that state courts 
reviewing challenges to determinations by the Commission need to be 
more probing in assessing whether an investigative determination was 
based on adequate investigation. 
Even if a complaint had previously been filed with the State Division of 
Human Rights, the City Human Rights Law had permitted an action to be 
commenced under its provisions if the State complaint had first been 
dismissed by the State Division for “administrative convenience.”331
 
 326. See 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 
  
Subsequent to the 1991 Amendments, the State Human Rights Law was 
changed to permit an “annulment” of a complainant’s election of 
22, at 4 n.5 (citing CRAIG GURIAN, ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION CENTER OF METRO NEW YORK, AT THE CROSSROADS: IS THERE HOPE FOR 
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK? 6-10 (2003), available at 
www.antibiaslaw.com/crossroads.pdf. 
 327. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 4, amending  N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-109(g). 
 328. GURIAN, supra note 326, at 9. 
 329. Id. 
 330. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 4 n.6. 
 331. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(b). 
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remedies.332  The Restoration Act makes clear that such annulments revive 
an aggrieved party’s right to bring a claim under the City Human Rights 
Law as well.333
The 1991 Amendments required that, prior to an action being 
commenced pursuant to the City Human Rights Law, a copy of the 
complaint had to be filed with the City Commission and with the City’s 
Law Department.  The purpose was to make certain that the responsible 
local institutional entities tasked to fight discrimination would remain 
apprised of (and potentially intervene in) claims of discrimination.  Courts 
have understood that the purpose was not to create a jurisdictional 
barrier.
 
334  The Restoration Act modifies the provision to permit the 
serving of copies of the complaints on the agencies within ten days after 
the commencement of a civil action, and requires the agencies to designate 
a representative to receive the complaints.335  The use of the term “serve” 
was not and is not intended to convey a technical meaning.  The purpose is 
that the complaint is received by the agencies, regardless of the means 
used.336
PART III: ADDITIONAL ISSUES FOR IMMEDIATE RESOLUTION 
 
A. Retroactivity 
The Restoration Act has no explicit retroactivity provision; it says only 
that it is to take effect immediately upon enactment.337
Amendments are presumed to have prospective application unless the 
Legislature’s preference for retroactivity is explicitly stated or clearly 
indicated.  However, remedial legislation should be given retroactive 
effect in order to effectuate its beneficial purpose.  Other factors in the 
retroactivity analysis include whether the Legislature has made a specific 
pronouncement about retroactive effect or conveyed a sense of urgency; 
  Nevertheless, New 
York’s Court of Appeals balances two axioms of statutory interpretation in 
making a determination about retroactivity: 
 
 332. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(9) (McKinney 2005). 
 333. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 8, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(b). 
 334. See, e.g., Teller v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., N.Y.S.2d 314, 315 (App. Div. 1997) 
(provision is designed to provide notice to agencies and failure to comply is not bar to 
action); Bernstein v. 1995 Assocs., 630 N.Y.S.2d 68, 71-72 (App. Div. 1995) (same). 
 335. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 8, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(c). 
 336. Hence, it is contemplated that delivering the copy of the complaint by mail or by 
overnight delivery service is permissible, without a party first having attempted in-person 
delivery. 
 337. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 12. 
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whether the statute was designed to rewrite an unintended judicial 
interpretation; and whether the enactment itself reaffirms a legislative 
judgment about what the law in question should be.338
Two of the Restoration Act’s provisions are entirely new, and thus will 
have prospective application only.  These are the provision adding 
domestic partnership as a new basis of protected class status, and the 
provision increasing the maximum civil penalties that can be awarded in 
the administrative context.
 
339  The rest of the provisions, on the other hand, 
are appropriately applied retroactively.340
The two areas of the Restoration Act where retroactivity will be 
contested are the retaliation provision and the enhanced liberal construction 
provision.  In both cases, the Restoration Act was “designed to rewrite an 
unintended judicial interpretation” and “reaffirms a legislative judgment 
about what the law in question should be.”
 
341  The Restoration Act and its 
legislative history are replete with references to the need for clarification 
and reaffirmation.342  The text of the Act itself states that “it is the sense of 
the Council that New York City’s Human Rights Law has been construed 
too narrowly to ensure protection of all persons covered by the law.”343  
The 2005 Committee Report states that the Act “aims to ensure 
construction of the City’s Human Rights Law in line with the purposes of 
fundamental amendments to the law enacted in 1991.”344
Specifically with respect to retaliation, the 2005 Committee Report 
states that the point of the amendment is “to clarify the standard.”
 
345  This 
clarifying intention is highlighted specifically by the fact that the 1991 
Amendments had already attempted to broaden coverage by prohibiting 
retaliation “in any manner.”346
 
 338. In re Gleason, 749 N.E.2d 724, 726 (N.Y. 2001). 
  Here, as in Gleason, “the legislative history 
establishes that the purpose of the amendment was to clarify what the law 
 339. Where conduct that predates the effective date of the Restoration Act continues on 
after the effective date, of course, the higher maximums apply. 
 340. Retroactivity in terms of the filing provisions and the requirement of “thorough” 
investigations is routine, and does not warrant discussion. 
 341. In re Gleason, 96 N.Y.2d at 122. 
 342. In both cases, the law conveys a sense of urgency as well.  Unlike the 1991 
Amendments, which the Council clearly had in view, the Restoration Act does not contain 
any deferring language.  See 1991 Amendments, supra note 3, § 4; 1991 LEG. ANN., supra 
note 3, at 180 (setting forth deferred application of some provisions, and explicitly stating 
that several others were to be applied prospectively only). 
 343. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 1. 
 344. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 2. 
 345. Id. at 3. 
 346. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(7); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 160. 
GURIAN_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:12 PM 
172 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIII 
was always meant to do and say.”347
A covered entity that has taken negative action against a person prior to 
the effective date of the Restoration Act cannot be heard to complain of 
retroactive application on the ground that the retaliation did not rise to the 
“materiality standard.”  Such conduct not only comes under the local law’s 
1991 “in any manner” language, it is conduct as to which the covered entity 
had no legitimate or vested interest.
 
348
The enhanced liberal construction provision, of course, has application 
across the range of all provisions of the local law, and there is no difficulty 
concluding that the purpose of the provision “was to clarify what the law 
was always meant to do and say,” at least what it was always meant to do 
and say after the 1991 Amendments. The 2005 Committee Report, for 
example, not only states that the Restoration Act “aims to ensure 
construction of the City’s Human Rights Law in line with the purposes of 
fundamental amendments to the law enacted in 1991,” it pointedly 
incorporates Mayor Dinkins’ contemporaneous recitation of the Council’s 
intent in 1991 to require liberal and independent construction of the law.
 
349
For most provisions of the City Human Rights Law, there was either not 
a specific interpretation of the language of the City Human Rights Law 
provision
 
350
Decisions that have been rendered by the Court of Appeals which have 
not considered the language or purpose of the City statute not only fail to 
meet the requirements of amended section 8-130, they failed to meet the 
liberal construction requirements of the pre-Restoration Act City Human 
—let alone one according with the existing liberal construction 
requirement—or an interpretation rendered by the State Court of Appeals.  
As such, decisions that henceforth determine what the law properly “was” 
in respect to these provisions in the period from the 1991 Amendments to 
the enactment of the Restoration Act would not, in most cases even involve 
the “overruling” of a decision of the State’s highest court, but rather would 
involve either a simple reading of the substantive statutory language or the 
application of the pre-Restoration Act liberal construction provision.  
Retroactive application concerning such “under-interpreted” provisions of 
the City law cannot be said to upset “settled expectations.” 
 
 347. In re Gleason, 96 N.Y.2d at 122. 
 348. The argument to the contrary, that covered entities were somehow relying on the 
materiality loophole, that is, they were justified in trying to take retaliatory action as close to 
the line as possible, is not a value to be countenanced under the City Human Rights Law.  
One hopes, in any event, that it will be an argument that induces the Second Circuit to 
rethink the utility and appropriateness of its own standard. 
 349. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 2. 
 350. For example, the Court of Appeals in Levin simply did not interpret the “terms and 
conditions” provision of the statute. 
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Rights Law.  As such, allowing such decisions to govern any proceedings, 
including proceedings relating to conduct that occurred prior to October 3, 
2005, would defeat the remedial purposes not only of the Restoration Act, 
but of the 1991 Amendments as well. 
It is important to note that retroactive application cannot seriously be 
said to impair any “vested interest” of any individual or entity subject to the 
law.  In terms of vicarious liability, for example, a covered entity either did 
or did not have a vested interest in encouraging, condoning, or furthering 
harassing conduct by an employee.  If it did not, it cannot claim a vested 
interest in Forrest’s failure to apply the plain language of section 8-
107(13)(b)(1) of the New York City Human Rights Law.  If the covered 
entity did have a vested interest in encouraging, condoning, or furthering 
such harassing conduct, it is in any event liable under existing State Human 
Rights Law principles, and is not harmed by application of City law 
liability stemming in any event from 1991 Amendments language. 
There is, finally, an important issue of avoiding confusion in the 
administration of justice that counsels retroactive application.  If courts 
were to begin to decide cases based on old notions of what the law “was”—
as opposed to what the Restoration Act clarified the law was intended to 
be—we will likely be faced with a new series of decisions that fail to 
engage in the analysis required by the Restoration Act, the routine citation 
of which will lead to a failure to take the necessary new steps to determine 
what, post-Restoration Act, the law “is” hereafter supposed to be. 
B. Jury Instructions 
Developing and promulgating model jury instructions for cases 
implicating provisions of the City’s Human Rights Law is a task that 
warrants urgent attention.  It is clear that some City Human Rights Law 
standards already differ from their state and federal counterparts.  More 
will come to differ as judges begin to construe provisions to accomplish the 
uniquely broad and remedial purposes of the City law.  Still others will 
come to differ as federal law becomes more narrow and, thanks to the 
Restoration Act, City law resists being ratcheted down.  As such, existing 
instructions need to be thoroughly reviewed: they reflect the carbon copy 
bias that the Restoration Act seeks to eliminate. 
Instructions distinguishing the proof requirements of the City Human 
Rights Law from those of counterpart civil rights statutes should not be 
difficult to develop.351
 
 351. In a case where the retaliation alleged arguably does not meet the federal materiality 
standard, for example, a judge would point out that the City Human Rights Law claim does 
  Nevertheless, it may be useful to consider the 
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increased use of special interrogatories.  Take, for example, a case where 
Jane Smith alleges that her supervisor, John Jones, sexually harassed her.  
Smith brings an EEOC charge against her employer, ABC Corporation, but 
not against Jones, because individuals are not liable under Title VII.  After 
the EEOC fails to investigate her charge in 180 days, plaintiff Smith 
commences an action in United States District Court for the Eastern or 
Southern District of New York alleging that ABC violated her rights under 
Title VII and the City Human Rights Law, and that Jones violated her 
rights under the latter statute.  Because the City Human Rights Law permits 
individuals to be held responsible for their discriminatory acts,352
Assume that it has come to be recognized that the City Human Rights 
Law should not insulate defendants who have engaged in harassment by 
imposing a “severe or pervasive”                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
hurdle over which to jump, and the alternative formulation suggested 
earlier in this article has been accepted.
 and 
because there is a common core of operative facts, the federal court 
assumes supplemental jurisdiction of the City Human Rights Law claim, 
both as against ABC and as against Jones. 
353  Assume as well that the 
presiding judge has read the strict liability provisions of section 8-
107(13)(b)(1). There are basic ways in which instructions relating to the 
two statutes would need to differ, and for which special interrogatories 
would be helpful. 354
The jury would be asked, “Did plaintiff demonstrate that Jones treated 
her less favorably because of gender?”  If the answer were “no,” then 
judgment would be entered for both defendants on all claims. 
 
If the answer were yes, the jury would be asked, “Did defendants 
demonstrate that the conduct alleged consisted of merely petty slights or 
trivial annoyances?  If the answer to this question were “yes,” then 
judgment would be entered for both defendants on all claims. 
 
not require a showing that the retaliation complained of resulted in an ultimate employment 
action or a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment, and would 
further explain that a plaintiff in that circumstance would need to prove that that the 
retaliatory act or acts complained of were reasonably likely to deter an employee from 
engaging in protected activity. 
 352. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(1)(a); see supra notes 75–90 and accompanying text. 
 353. See supra notes 190–213 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proposal 
that all harassment should be proscribed except where the covered entity proves as an 
affirmative defense that the challenged actions “consisted of no more than what a reasonable 
victim of discrimination would consider petty slights and trivial annoyances.” 
 354. This illustration also assumes that the evidence only supports a single motive 
charge.  Potential differences in the definition of “supervisor” under the two laws, and a 
variety of differences relating to the imposition of punitive damages are also among the 
issues not treated here. 
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If the answer to the second question were “no,” then plaintiff would 
have judgment against Jones on the City Human Rights Law claim. 
The third question that the jury would need to answer would be, “Did 
Smith exercise supervisory responsibility for ABC?”  If the answer to this 
question were “yes,” then plaintiff would have judgment against ABC on 
the City Human Rights Law claim. 
There would only remain questions relating to the Title VII claim 
against ABC.  One relates to whether the conduct alleged was sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to create a hostile environment.  If the answer to this 
question were “no,” then judgment would be entered for ABC on the Title 
VII claim. 
If the answer to the “severe or pervasive” question were “yes,” then a 
question would need to be posed as to whether defendant had made out 
both prongs of the Faragher/Ellerth defense.  A “yes” answer from the jury 
would yield judgment for ABC on the Title VII claim; an answer of “no” 
would yield judgment for plaintiff against ABC on the Title VII claim. 
Special interrogatories such as these will make it simpler for juries (and 
judges) to navigate the variety of different standards set out by City, State, 
and federal civil rights law. 
CONCLUSION 
There may well be those who say that the 1991 Amendments and the 
Restoration Act represent a series of policy choices that are distinctly too 
plaintiff-friendly; that are insufficiently attentive to the needs of covered 
entities; and that rely too much on a law enforcement model of detect, 
punish, and deter.  In her or his private life, a judge is free to vote for City 
Council candidates who would make different policy choices.  In the 
meantime, the only lawful and responsible course of judicial action is to 
respect the policy choices that have been made.  These choices respect and 
honor the unique ability of judges to take center stage in the advance of 
social justice by the simple and profound task of giving “thoughtful, 
independent consideration” to what interpretation would best fulfill “the 
uniquely broad and remedial purposes of the City’s Human Rights 
Law.”355
The fact that few have thus far awakened to the potential of the City 
Human Rights Law in the fifteen years since this passage of the 1991 
Amendments must not and does not change this obligation.  It remains a 
sad fact of our history that Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes went 
unenforced for many decades.  Yet, as a Supreme Court that finally 
 
 
 355. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5 n.8. 
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recognized its obligation to give life to Section 1982 wrote: “The fact that 
the statute lay partially dormant for many years cannot be held to diminish 
its force today.”356
 
 
 
 356. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968). 
